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Freeing the Parties From the Law:
Designing an Interest and
Rights Focused Model of
Landlord/Tenant Mediation
Joel Kurtzberg and JamieHenikoff
The law is a tool, not an end in itself I
--former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger

I. INTRODUCTION
While mediation has grown in popularity in recent years, critiques of mediation
abound, claiming that mediation hurts the poor and the disempowered by paying too
little attention to the legal rights designed to protect them.2
* Joel Kurtzberg, J.D., Harvard Law School, '96, A.B., Harvard College, '91, is the law clerk to
Judge Sarah S. Vance, Eastern District of Louisiana. He is also the former president of the Harvard
Mediation Program. Jamie Henikofl J.D., Harvard Law School, 196, M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, A.B., Harvard College, '91, is an associate with McKinsey & Company, an international
management consulting firm. She is the former training director of the Harvard Mediation Program.
The authors would like to thank Chuck Doran, Gary Friedman, Gordon Shaw, Roger Bertling, and
Robert Mnookin for their invaluable help in researching these issues.

1. W. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
2. See e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: PanaceaorAnathema? 99 HARV.

L. REV. 668, 679 (1986) ("The wholesale diversion of cases involving the legal rights of the poor [by
mediation] may result in the definition of these rights by the powerful in our society rather than by the
application of fundamental societal values reflected in the rule of law."); Richard Delgado, et. al.,
Fairnessand Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIs.

L. REV. 1359, 1391-92 (mediation "reinforc[es] powerful ... forces in society ... [and] inhibits social
change by persuading disputants with legitimate grievances to sacrifice their grievances in the interests
of peace and cooperation."); Laura Nader, ControllingProcesses in the Practiceof Law: Hierarchyand
Pacificationin the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 13 (1993)

(arguing that mediation uses a technique 'which discourages people from asserting their rights when they
have been injured'); Richard L. Abel, The Contradictionsof Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 267, 280-95 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) [hereinafter
INFORmAL JUSTICE] (mediation serves to 'neutralize conflict" by addressing the demands of the poor and

disadvantaged without reference to formalized legal protections such as rights); Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100 YALE L. J. 1545, 1567 (1991) (mandatory

mediation discourages assertion of rights thus harming women, the poor, and minorities). For a similar
critique applied to women in the context of divorce mediation, see Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly:
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 441, 443-44 (1992) ("Negotiating

lawyers rely upon... legal entitlements and craft divorce agreements reflecting them, thereby loosening
the control men traditionally wield over economic resources and the socialization of children. While
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According to the critics, mediators treat "the law" as an obstacle to creative
agreements3 and obscure the problem by focusing solely on the seductive rhetoric
of "interests" and "autonomy," while parties unwittingly forfeit their legal protections
and acquiesce to the demands of the powerful. Although the disempowered may
typically leave a mediation feeling satisfied,4 it is only because they are usually
unaware of what they have conceded.5 This view holds that mediation is especially
dangerous in situations in which (1) the poor or disempowered are afforded
significant formal legal protections, and (2) they are generally unaware of these
protections. Such is clearly the case in the context of the Massachusetts housing
law, where tenants are generally poor' and unaware of their legal rights.
In this article, we point out two fundamental flaws of the critique. First, the
critique compares mediation to an idealized view of adjudication instead of
comparing mediation to its real-life alternatives. Second, it takes a narrow view of
the role of law in mediation, erroneously assuming that mediators must either ignore
the law or impose it on the parties. Part I of this article spells out the critics' claim
that mediation generally harms the poor and disempowered by failing to adequately
incorporate formal legal protections into the process. Part II examines the critique
as it is applied to the landlord-tenant context; specifically, this section focuses on the

mediation proponents employ the... rhetoric of relatedness, mediation unobtrusively reduces this threat
to patriarchy by returning men to their former dominant position.*).
3. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (1987) (noting that alternative dispute resolution proponents perceive substantive law as "frustrating
creative results"); see also Janet Rifkin, Mediationfrom a FeministPerspective:Promise and Problems,
2 LAW & INQ. J. 21, 27 (1984) (arguing that law is an irrelevant constraint on the mediator's ability to
bring parties to agreement).
4. See e.g., Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt, MEDIATION RESEARCH 10-25 (1989) (showing that
even parties who go through mandatory mediation are satisfied with the process).
5. The alleged victims of mediation are often unaware that they have been harmed on an individual
level. Moreover, mediation makes the poor less likely to realize that others in similar situations are
experiencing the same harms and, thus, makes them less likely to mobilize politically in support of their
class interests.
6. This article will proceed with the assumption that tenants who are threatened with eviction are
generally poor and have less power and money than most landlords. While it is certainly true that not
all tenants are poor and disempowered-or that all landlords are rich and powerful-it is safe to say that
an overwhelming majority of the tenants who are evicted are less rich and less powerful than the
landlords who evict them. Anyone who has ever visited an urban housing court will admit that this
assumption is generally a fair one in spite of the fact that there are some notable exceptions. See e.g.,
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal
Process,20 HoFsTRA L. REV. 533, 557 (1992) ('Rent court, more than most other courts, is a theater of
class conflict in which businesses and their hirelings constitute a class of professional claimants
exercising significant advantages over the individual defendants whom they bring before the court, who
are poor and poorly situated with respect to the attributes that garner respectful hearing in court rooms.")
Both common sense and anecdotal evidence from tenants' advocates and those who regularly mediate
eviction cases corroborate the reasonableness of this assumption. Telephone interview with Gordon
Shaw, Mediation Coordinator at Hampshire Community Action Commission (Apr. 15, 1996) [hereinafter
"Shaw Interview"]; Interview with Chuck Doran, Mediator at Mediation Works, Inc., in Kingston, Mass.,
(Feb. 12, 1996) [hereinafter 'Doran Interview"]; Interview with Roger Bertling, housing attorney at Hale
& Dorr Legal Services Center, in Jamaica Plain, Mass. (Mar. 27, 1996) [hereinafter "Bertling
Interview"].
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power imbalances which impact landlord-tenant negotiations and the many,
frequently unknown, formal legal protections that the Massachusetts housing law
provides to tenants. Part III offers a response to the critique by arguing that
mediation need not ignore legal rights and protections and that mediation fares fairly
well in comparison to the actual, real-life alternatives. Part IV provides a theoretical
framework for both describing and evaluating the various approaches to
incorporating the law into housing mediations and suggests that mediation remains
truest to its underlying principles when it focuses on both the legal rights and
personal interests of the parties, even though many mediators intuitively believe that
such a dual focus is not possible. Part V examines four different approaches to
incorporating the law into housing mediation and evaluates two of the approaches
by comparing them to their real-life alternatives. Finally, Part VI offers prescriptive
advice about how to best achieve the goal of a dual focus on rights and interests in
the landlord-tenant context. We suggest that to accomplish this task, mediators and
parties must not ignore the law, as some programs do, but rather address it directly.

II. THE CRITIQUE IN GENERAL
Critics of mediation point out that mediation hurts the poor and disempowered
on both an individual and a class level. According to the critics, poor disputants
who mediate do a disservice to themselves by typically accepting unjust agreements
and to other poor disputants by contributing to a system that prevents the poor from
politically mobilizing on a class level. At the core of one version of the critique'
lies the charge that mediation, in contrast to adjudication, fails to adequately deal

7. There is another, more radical, version of the critique which charges that both formal methods of
dispute resolution, such as adjudication, and informal methods of dispute resolution, such as mediation,
perpetuate power imbalances and serve to reinforce the status quo. See e.g., Mark H. Lazerson, In the
Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 2 at 158-60. These
radical critics have little faith in the legal system and argue that as long as different groups have unequal
bargaining strength, social justice cannot be furthered by any institutions of dispute resolution. See also,
Richard L. Abel, Redirecting Social Studies of Law, 14 LAW & Soc. REV. 805, 827 (1980); Marc
Galanter, Why the 'Haves'Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc.
REv. 95 (1974). Having no faith in the ability of legal reform to bring about social justice, these critics
argue that political organization aimed at achieving a more equal distribution of power is the key
strategy to be pursued in seeking justice. These radical critics seem to argue that 'formal justice" can
sometimes be used to correct power imbalances, but that "informal justice" (i.e., mediation) always
oppresses the underprivileged. See Lazerson, supra note 7, at 159 ('[An informal] legal system that
encourages conciliation between landlords and tenants-two parties with vastly unequal resources--by
curtailing the procedural rights of the weaker can only succeed in amplifying that inequality ....
[However,] whether formal justice serves the status quo depends very much on the nature of the status
quo.") While we agree with these critics that both mediation and adjudication can be used to perpetuate
power imbalance, we disagree with their implicit conclusion that informal means of justice, such as
mediation, cannot ever adequately deal with power imbalances. This article will focus on the
mainstream critique which looks to adjudication as an adequate response to power imbalance. However,
the response also applies to the more radical critique in that it suggests ways in which mediation can
adequately deal with power imbalances.
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with power imbalances! In this view, mediation is based on a well-intentioned, but
somewhat naive, romanticism, which erroneously assumes that disputing parties
have roughly equal bargaining power.' In the words of one critic:
[A]dvocates of ADR... act as though courts arose to resolve quarrels
between neighbors who had reached an impasse and turned to a stranger
for help .... By viewing the lawsuit as a quarrel between two neighbors,
the dispute-resolution story that underlies ADR implicitly asks us to
assume a rough equality between the contending parties. It treats
settlement as the anticipation of the outcome of trial and assumes that the
terms of settlement are simply a product of the parties' prediction of that
outcome. In truth, however, settlement is also a function of the resources
available to each party... and those resources are frequently distributed
unequally.' 0
According to these critics, mediation pays too little attention to power
differentials among parties and inevitably leads to agreements that merely reflect
these power differentials. Even though both parties might consent to a final
agreement, critics argue that "[p]arties [often] settle while leaving justice undone.""
The critics see the goal of mediation as being to "maximize the ends of private
parties" and to "secure the peace," and they argue that these goals pale in comparison
to the ultimate goal of adjudication, which is insuring justice. 2 A powerful example
illustrates this point: "Imagine . . . [what] would have resulted had all race
discrimination cases in the sixties and seventies been mediated rather than
adjudicated." 3 Sometimes justice requires more than simply "keeping the peace".
Thus, judges are not simply strangers who settle disputes among neighbors as the
"mediation parable" would have it; rather, they are public officials authorized "to
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and bring reality into accord with

8. There is a rich literature surrounding "power" and negotiation. While power has proven difficult
to define with much precision, most theorists equate power with the ability of one party to influence
another to behave in accordance with the first party's wishes. See MORTON DEUTsCH, THE RESOLUTION
OF CONFLICT 84 (1973); P.H. GULLIVER, DIsPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 186-90 (1979); DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 87 (1981); R.H. TAWNEY,
EQUALITY 159 (1964); MAx WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 152
(1947).
9. See Lazerson, supra note 7, at 159 ( ... much of the propaganda for informal justice,
neighborhood justice centers, and mediation... expresses an idealist perspective that is not
historically or empirically rooted.").
10. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1075-76 (1984).
11. See id. at 1085.
12. Id.
13. Edwards, supra note 2, at 679; see also, Fiss, supra note 10, at 1089 (citing Brown v. Bd of Ed.

of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (illustrating a prime example of how adjudication
helps bring about justice in ways that settlement cannot).
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them."'1 4 In so doing, judges level the playing field by bringing society closer to its
chosen ideals which often include significant protections for the poor and
disadvantaged.
The critics argue that adjudication helps insure justice by providing individuals
with formal substantive and procedural legal rights. Mediators, critics charge, ignore
these formal protections by typically viewing "the law"as "getting in the way" of the
central focus of the mediation: the interests of the parties.' 5 Mediators often
emphasize that the goal in mediation is a "fair" agreement-- generally defined as one
that is subjectively fair to each of the parties.' 6 Objective standards of fairness, such
as the law, are therefore perceived as either an obstacle to creative option-generating
on the part of the parties or as entirely irrelevant to the process. Critics charge that
"[t]he irrelevance of formal...law and the lack of objective fairness standards creates
great confusion for mediators," who let the parties decide for themselves what they
think is fair, "trusting a somewhat foggy commitment to 'self-determination. ' " In
the minds of most mediators, the law is not relevant to the parties' internally
developed standards of fairness. Critics believe that this mediation approach
frequently leads to injustice by undercutting the "public values" underlying our
formal legal principles.
In fact, critics contend that mediators typically go out of their way to avoid
discussions of the law, using "informal sanctions" to encourage the parties to replace
the rhetoric of principles, blame, and rights with the rhetoric of compromise and
relationship. 8 For instance, mediators frequently urge the parties to "eschew[] the
language of individual rights in favor of the language of interdependent
relationships."' 9 Similarly, parties are typically discouraged from complaining about
past behavior of the other party and from focusing on fault or blame. Instead, they
are encouraged to be "forward-looking" and focus solely on how the problems of the

14. Fiss, supra note 10, at 1085.
15. See Rifkin, supra note 3,at 27; Brunet, supra note 3, at 3-4.
16. A small number of mediators define fairness in relation to what the court would have decided
had the case gone to trial. Critics rightfully point out that if this legalistic definition of fairness is
accepted, then it can no longer be said that the parties are in control of the normative issues at stake in
the mediation. Moreover, it reduces the possible benefits of mediation to lower cost and greater
efficiency rather than adjudication. See Grillo, supra note 2, at 1593.
17. Bryan, supra note 2, at 506 n. 271. Professor Bryan cites the following passage as an illustration
of the confusion:
Fairness in property division and allocation of material resources involves a number of
external or objective criteria, but even in this area, internal factors play a role. How do you
assess whether the "bottom line" is fair? A 50150 agreement somehow inherently appears
....However, in mediation the couple has an opportunity to develop their own
to be fair
standards of equity, which may not be the same as those prevailing in the community. To
what extent does the mediator allow these standards to deviate from the prevailing ones?
And what percentages are within the parameters of fairness?
Joan Dworkin & William London, What Is a Fair Agreement? 7 MEDIATION Q. 3, 8-9 (1989).
Dworkin and London leave these questions for the parties to respond to, relying on the principle of selfdetermination. Id.at 11.
18. Grillo, supra note 2, at 1560.
19. Id. (quoting Merry & Silbey, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POLY 7, 29 (1986)).
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past can be avoided in the future. 0 The end result of mediation's uinformal
sanctions" against discussions of fault and blame is that rights are frequently ignored.
More importantly, mediation often does not live up to its promise to "contextualize
conflict" by tailoring a solution to the individual needs of the parties. Frequently, the
critics point out, past history and perceptions of who is uat fault" are important issues
and need to be addressed to adequately chart the best course for the future. To
ignore these issues is to ignore the relevant context of the dispute, which is
something on which mediation is supposed to focus. As one critic put it, "[t]he risk
of mediation is that if principles are abandoned, and context is not effectively
introduced, we end up with the worst of both worlds."2
At the core of the problem, according to the critics, lies an inherent tension
between two of the central principles of mediation--neutrality and selfdetermination--and mediation's ability to protect the weaker party from unfair
outcomes.22 Neutrality in its purest form requires mediators to refrain from
attempting to influence the substantive outcome of the mediation.23 Likewise, the
principle of self-determination requires that mediators allow parties to make
decisions for themselves. Both principles lead mediators to the conclusion that the
only acceptable way to deal with power imbalance is by focusing on process and not
on the substance of agreements. According to the critics, however, attention to
process alone is not enough to protect the disempowered. True empowerment of the
parties often requires intervention in the substance of agreements.24 Allegedly

20. Grillo, supra note 2, at 1563.
21. Id. at 1558.
22. See Bryan, supra note 2, at 504. The insights of Professor Carol Steiker are worth noting here.

Professor Steiker has observed that whenever legal theorists or philosophers say that there is an "inherent
tension" between two principles, what they usually mean is that the two principles completely contradict
each other and are, in the end, entirely irreconcilable. Carol Steiker, Criminal Law Lecture at Harvard
Law School (Fall 1993).
23. Strict neutrality is a human impossibility, since mediators inevitably bring with them their own
personal biases based, among other things, on their social class, ethnicity, and upbringing. See Lee E.
Teitelbaum & Laura DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Divorce: Natural Experimentation in
Family Law, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1093, 1125 (1988); Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and
the Social Control Problems ofAmerican Capitalism: A Perspective, in INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note
2, at 242. Moreover, mediators can sometimes subtly influence an agreement's substance indirectly by

indicating their preferences to the parties by focusing on various options and deemphasizing others. See
Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 Mo. J.DiSP. RESOL. 141. Most sources
suggest that neutrality requires mediators to refrain from intentionally attempting to influence the
substance of an agreement, thus recognizing the possibility-or perhaps the inevitability--of inadvertent
influences on substance.
24. See Bryan, supra note 2, at 502-05. At issue are really two separate notions of empowerment
which rest on a foundation of two separate notions of autonomy. The first notion of empowerment-that
criticized by opponents of mediation- contends that parties are empowered when they make decisions
for themselves. The second notion ofempowerment takes issue with this notion, arguing that parties are
only empowered when they make fully informed decisions for themselves. According to this second
notion of empowerment, in our imperfect world where parties often don't have the information needed
to make informed choices truly autonomous decisions sometimes require outside intervention - (i.e.,
outside parties leading people to the choices that they wouldhave made had they been fully informed

and uncoerced).
The second notion of autonomy is generally applied to instances when there is "market failure"

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/5
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neutral process tactics, such as allowing both parties ample opportunity to speak, do
not do much to level the playing field or to assure fair outcomes given the nature of
the power disparities that typically exist between the rich and poor. A weaker party
may actually speak more than a more powerful one, but the few words spoken by the
2
powerful party may reflect his or her greater levels of knowledge, self-agency,
negotiating skill, or interpersonal skill, thus leading to an unjust result.' In short,
critics charge that mediators focus on process at the expense of substance and that
focusing on process alone is not enough to adequately address power imbalances.
Furthermore, critics charge that mediation "individualizes grievances" which
inhibits the perception of common grievances and reduces the likelihood of
collective action on the part of the poor and disempowered. The private and
confidential nature of the process, while necessary for mediation to work, effectively
isolates complainants from each other and from the community, thus preventing
them from realizing that others in similar situations often have common complaints.
The disempowered may 'win' cases as individuals but lose as members of a wider
social class.2 7 In short, mediation focuses on the individual at the expense of the
collective group, encouraging conciliation and peacefulness in individual cases
where the appropriate response often would be to collectively fight back by asserting
formal legal rights.
In sum, the critics suggest that though mediation may trim court dockets, it does
so at a large cost. The parties may claim to be satisfied with agreements they have
reached, but these agreements may not bring justice. Instead, they simply provide
the rich and powerful with an easy way to circumvent the protections that the formal
law provides for the underprivileged. Where the formal law is particularly protective
of the poor and disadvantaged, the community has voiced a significant concern that
such protections are necessary. In such contexts, we should be particularly skeptical

of some kind. For example, our laws prevent tenants from contracting out of the implied warranty of
habitability because society is concerned that, due to imperfections in the market, tenants will be unable

to make an informed and uncoerced choice in the matter. The rationale underlying the law is that no
fully informed consumer would freely agree to live in an uninhabitable apartment. Thus, the law seeks
to provide tenants with what they would have bargained for if they were fully informed and able to make
a truly free choice. Essentially, the critics oftmediation charge that mediation is based on the first notion
of autonomy, and that the second notion is more appropriate in cases where there is a significant power
imbalance (i.e., a market failure).
25. Erica L. Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation,
1 HARV. NEOTIATiON L. REv. 85, 86 (1996). Ms. Fox notes that tenants frequently have difficulty

adequately asserting their own interests. She refers to the ability to adequately represent oneself as
'self-agency." It is in this sense that we use that term here.
26. See Bryan, supra note 2, at 504-05.
27. Hofrichter, supra note 23, at 240. For example, Legal Services lawyers describe the importance
of developing a political strategy that will help improve the legal position of all tenants. See e.g., Gary
Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106
(1973). In the 1970s, many legal aide centers-in Boston and New York, for example-intentionally took
on and vigorously defended all eviction cases in an attempt to control a large percentage of the court
docket, thereby having an influence on the direction of the courts' development of the law. According
to the critics, mediation precludes, and even thwarts, such efforts to improve the lot of all tenants. See
Lazerson, supra note 7, at 158-60.
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when the poor and disadvantaged 'voluntarily,n and perhaps even happily, agree to
something less than what society has deemed them entitled. We should be even
more skeptical when they do so through a process, such as mediation, that tends to
play down the significance of these protections and instead leaves it to the parties,
who often have significant differences in bargaining power, to hash out on their own
what they consider to be fair.
Housing disputes take place in the exact context that critics fear most.
Considerable power differentials between landlords and tenants often exist in
eviction proceedings. Moreover, tenants' ignorance of the significant protections
afforded to them by the law make them vulnerable to the unfair suggestions of the
powerful. To fully appreciate the potential dangers of mediation in landlord/tenant
cases, it is necessary to grasp both the significance and the extent of the power
differentials between landlords and tenants, as well as the formal laws designed to
protect tenants from injustice.

III. THE CRITIQUE AS APPLIED
A. Power Differentials between Landlordsand Tenants
The majority of tenants subject to eviction actions are members of groups that
are relatively without power.2" Tenants who are sued for nonpayment of rent are
almost always poor and living near subsistence. In contrast, landlords generally have
more money, education, and experience with navigating the court system.29
Moreover, most landlords benefit from the services of experienced agents and
lawyers who have considerable negotiating experience, knowledge of the law, and

28. See supra note 6. Tenants subject to eviction actions are fairly likely to be poor, minority, and/or
female. See e.g., Bezdek, supra note 6, at 540 (describing the Baltimore area); Fox, supra note 25, at
92-93 (describing the Boston area). As one scholar has noted, the word 'tenant" itself 'is an assignment
to a culturally recognized economic class of persons excluded from property ownership and its literal
and symbolic means for autonomous participation in the social order, in its economic, civil, political,
and social dimensions." Bezdek, supra note 6, at 540 n.24.
29. Shaw Interview, supra note 6 (describing landlords and tenants in the Northampton area); Doran
Interview, supra note 6 (describing landlords and tenants in the 'South Shore" area); Bertling Interview,
supra note 6 (describing landlords and tenants in the Boston area). These observations are also based
on the authors' visits to District Courts in Northampton, Plymouth, Hingham, Quincy, and West
Roxbury, and to the Boston Housing Court, as well as one of the author's observations while working
as a student advocate for tenants in the Boston area at the Hale & Doff Legal Services Center in Jamaica
Plain, Massachusetts during the Fall of 1995.
It is noteworthy that all of the individuals with whom we spoke - mediators, tenants' advocates,
and even one professional landlord - agreed that tenants are extraordinarily uninformed of their rights.
For example, one tenants' advocate claimed that, "[bly far the biggest problem facing tenants in
summary process proceedings is that they don't understand their rights." Bertling Interview, supra note
6. One mediator estimated that tenants' awareness of their rights was 'very, very low." Doran Interview,
supra note 6.
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familiarity with the relevant courts and judges.3" As one scholar has noted, these
differences give landlords a considerable negotiating advantage:
The primary operators in the rent court are a class of business agents
whose repeated participation in the forum is a kind of legal education in
the scope and form of legal claiming which is adequate to preclude even
a minimal contest by most tenants and sufficient to defeat the few tenants
who muster more. The representatives' . . . [repetition] provides a
confidence in conducting business before the court, borne of a certain
amount of familiarity with the setting and its rhythms, as well as the
presiding officials.3
The typical mediation, therefore, is between an experienced lawyer or landlord who
knows both the law and the system, and a tenant who is not familiar with either.
Thus, the tenants are often at a decided disadvantage.

B. The Consequences of Power Imbalance: Tenants Failureto Assert
Themselves and Mediation'sDifficulty In Adequately Responding
A number of observers have noted that the combination of all of these power

differentials often discourages tenants from asserting their own interests and legal
rights when negotiating with landlords and/or their agents.32 Consider the following
"typical" exchange between a tenant and a landlord's lawyer which was recorded by
an observer at the Boston Housing Court. Arnold Moses, the tenant, spent an hour
and a half talking to fellow tenants in the hallway of the court about the decrepit state
of his apartment, the number of times he told the landlord to fix the problems, and
the fact that the landlord never did anything about them. He seemed to be aware
that he was legally entitled to have the landlord make the repairs. When it was

30. In the four courts we examined, landlords were represented by counsel in 75.2% of the cases at
Northampton District Court, 70.4% of the cases at Plymouth District Court, 60.5% of the cases at
Hingham District Court, and 58.0% of the cases at Quincy District Court. A large percentage of the
cases in which landlords were not represented involved repeat players, such as the Quincy Housing
Authority, who had, for all intents and purposes, a representative who was as knowledgeable and as
experienced with housing cases as most housing attorneys. In contrast, tenants were represented by
counsel in only 10.2% of the cases at Plymouth District Court, 11.0% of the cases at Hingham District
Court, and 6.2% of the cases at Quincy District Court. In all courts combined, 60.4% of landlords had
counsel while only 7.8% of tenants did.
31. Bezdek, supra note 6, at 556-57. See also Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limit of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 98-103 (1974); Beatrice A.
Moulton, Note, The Persecution andIntimidation of the Low-Income Litigant As Performed by the Small

Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1657, 1662 (1969); Fox, supra note 25, at 92-93. Our own
research confirms that in the courts we examined, 81.8% of landlords were either repeat players or were
represented by counsel, while the same was only true for 8.1% of tenants.
32. One writer has described tenants' silence and inability to assert their own interests as a lack of
"self-agency." See Fox, supra note 25, at 86. See also Bezdek, supra note 6, at 566-75 (describing the
various ways power differentials lead tenants to remain silent when negotiating with landlords or
appearing at hearings at "rent court').
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Arnold's turn to negotiate with the landlord's lawyer, however, the following
exchange occurred:
Lawyer: Are you Arnold Moses? (Arnold nodded.)
Lawyer: You owe three hundred and fifty dollars. Is that correct?
(Arnold nodded.)
Lawyer: How long do you need? (Arnold shrugged.)
Lawyer: Your landlord wants three hundred and fifty dollars over
seven months. That's fifty dollars a month, March through
September, the fifteenth of each month. Can you do that?
Arnold: Okay.
Lawyer: Okay, Mr. Moses. You wait here and I'll go write up an
agreement."
After the lawyer left, Arnold was asked why he did not tell the lawyer what he had
told the other tenants. Arnold responded, "People here are afraid to talk. You know,
you get that inner fear, and you're too afraid to say anything."34
Tenants' advocates often find that tenants have difficulties asserting
themselves, even when talking to their own lawyer. For this reason, student
advocates interviewing prospective housing clients are instructed to always ask very
specific questions regarding the condition of the prospective client's apartment.
Interactions such as the following which took place between one of the authors and
a prospective client are not uncommon:

Joel Kurtzberg [JK]: What about the condition of the apartment? Do
you have any things that need to be fixed or repaired?
Prospective Client: No. Not really.
JK: Well, do you have adequate heat?
Prospective Client: Yes.
JK: Do you have any problems with leaks?
Prospective Client: No.
JK: How about any problems with cockroaches?
Prospective Client: Yes. We've got lots of those. And rats too!.
JK: Do you have any smoke alarms?
Prospective Client: No.. .

33. Fox, supra note 25; at 98-99.
34. Id. at 98.
35. The conversation has been reconstructed over a year after it occurred. While it may not reflect

the exact words said, it does capture the essence of a conversation that occurred multiple times over the
course of a single semester. The roach and rodent infestation, along with the lack of smoke alarms,
would have entitled this tenant to withhold some rent if the landlord had been informed of the problems

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/5

10

1997]

Kurtzberg and Henikoff: Kurtzberg: Freeing the Parties from the Law:
Landlord/TenantMediation

How many mediators--or judges for that matter--would have continued this
line of questioning with a tenant after an initial response that there were no problems
with conditions in the apartment? Yet, often such persistence is required to get to
the bottom of things. While not all tenants are like the one in this example, one
Legal Services Attorney in Boston estimated that at least one-third of his clients say
that they have no conditions when first asked, despite the existence of considerable
code violations.36 Hence, there is good reason to believe that a substantial number
of tenants have a difficult time asserting themselves. Critics contend that mediators
in their struggle to maintain neutrality and treat the parties equally typically fail to
do enough to encourage tenants to assert themselves.
C. Society's Reaction to Power Imbalance: Tenants' Many Legal
Protectionsand Mediation'sDifficulty in PreservingThem
A generally recognized revolution occurred in American landlord-tenant law
in the 1960's and 1970's which greatly expanded tenants' procedural and substantive
rights. 3" Prior to the late 1960s, the law in most jurisdictions was simple: caveat
emptor or caveat lessee, meaning let the buyer/lessee beware. In the classic scheme,
the landlord had only two major legal obligations to the tenant: (1) to give the tenant
a clear right to possession at the inception of the lease by producing good title,3" and
(2) to respect the tenant's "implied covenant of quiet enjoyment" by not materially
disturbing his use or enjoyment of the property once the lease commenced.39
Landlords had no duty to deliver the premises in good condition and no implied
obligation to repair any defects on the premises during the term of the lease.' The
tenant was expected to examine the premises prior to signing the lease and to decide
for himself/herself whether it was suitable for his/her purposes. 4' Thus, any risk of

or had been aware of them beforehand.
36. Bertling Interview, supra note 6.
37. See e.g., Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in ResidentialLandlord-TenantLaw: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 517-27 (1984); Mary A. Glendon, The Transformation of
American Landlord-TenantLaw, 23 B.C. L. REv. 503 (1982); Deborah H. Bell, ProvidingSecurity of
Tenurefor Residential Tenants: Good Faithas a Limitation on the Landlord'sRight to Terminate," 19
GA. L. REv. 483, 483-504 (1985).
38. 1 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 182 at 1147-54, 1156-67 (1910).
39. Id. § 79 at 522-23.
40. See CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 285-86 (2d ed. 1985); Rabin,
supra note 37, at 521-22. The only exception to this rule was that landlords had a duty to repair "latent

defects," which were known to them and not reasonably discoverable by the tenant. See J.SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 741 (1993).

41. The following statement captures the essence of the classical approach in Massachusetts quite
well:
It is now well settled, both here and in England, that in a lease of a building for a dwellinghouse or store no covenant is implied that it should be fit for occupation. (Citations
omitted.)... [E]ven where the landlord is bound by custom or express covenant to repair,
and by his failure to do so the premises become uninhabitable, or unfit for the purposes for
which they were leased, the tenant has no right to quit the premises, or to refuse to pay rent
according to his covenant, but his only remedy is by action for damages.
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damage to the premises was borne by the tenant who was obligated to make all
ordinary repairs during the life of the tenancy.42 Furthermore, courts considered the
contractual obligations of landlords and tenants to be independent of each other;
thus, each party's obligation to perform their part of the bargain was not contingent
upon the other party's performance. Hence, the tenant's legal obligation to pay full
rent continued even if the landlord violated an express covenant to make certain
repairs.43 Finally, under the "self-help" termination doctrine, a landlord could
remove tenants' belongings from the premises, cut off water or electricity, and
change the locks to forcibly evict a tenant who refused to relinquish possession after
a lease had allegedly been terminated."
The revolution of the 1960's and 1970's brought about sweeping changes in
landlord-tenant law across the country, replacing the old paradigm with a new one
which had significant increases in both procedural and substantive protections for
tenants. There is no question that a large part of the change was motivated by a
societal recognition that tenants needed significant formal legal protections to reduce
the disparity in their lack of bargaining power in relation to landlords. This is
illustrated by the landmark case of Javins v. FirstNationalRealty Corp.,45 which was

perhaps the single most influential case in bringing down the old regime. In Javins,
the court discarded several common law rules including: (1)the landlord's lack of
duty to keep the premises in a habitable condition, (2) the independence of the
tenant's legal obligation to pay rent from the landlord's legal obligation to make
agreed upon repairs, and (3) the constructive eviction requirement that a tenant must
leave the premises before asserting defenses to nonpayment of rent based on the
condition of the premises.
Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing for the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
held that "the common law itself must recognize the landlord's obligations to keep
his premises in a habitable condition" by implying a warranty from the landlord to
the tenant that the premises are habitable.' The warranty guaranteed that the
premises were given to the tenant in complete compliance with the Housing Code
and that compliance would continue throughout the term of the lease: "[B]y signing
the lease the landlord has undertaken a continuing obligation to the tenant to
Three main
maintain the premises in accordance with all applicable law."47
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Mass. 1973) (quoting Royce v. Guggenheim,
106 Mass. 201, 202-03 (1870)).

42. The tenant's obligations with respect to repairs were defined by the law of waste. Hence, the
tenant was obligated to make ordinary repairs, but not to make substantial, lasting, or general repairs that
would materially affect the value of the property. 1 Tiffany, supra note 38, § 109 at 706.
43. SINGER, supra note 40, at 741. The tenant's only remedy against a landlord's violation of a

covenant to do repairs was to sue the landlord for money damages. Unless the damage to the premises
were so bad as to completely deprive the tenant of any beneficial enjoyment-a "constructive eviction'the tenant could not get out of a lease early and had to continue to pay the full rent to the landlord, in
spite of the fact that the landlord was breaching the agreement. Id.
44. Id at 665-66.
45. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
46. Id at 1077.
47. Id. at 1081.
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rationales underlay Judge Wright's ruling. First, Judge Wright contended that the
assumptions that provided the basis of the common law rules were no longer valid
in modem society. 4 Second, he argued that the rationale underlying recent decisions
in consumer protection law applied to the landlord-tenant context and required that
the old rule be abandoned.49 Lastly, and most importantly for purposes of the
critique of mediation, Judge Wright stated that the inequality of bargaining power
between landlord and tenant in the urban housing market made such protections
necessary."0 With regards to the last rationale, Judge Wright explained that:
[T]he relationship of landlord and tenant suggests further compelling
reasons for the law's protection of the tenants' legitimate expectations of
quality. The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant
has been well documented. Tenants have very little leverage to enforce
demands for better housing. Various impediments to competition in the
rental housing market, such as racial and class discrimination and
standardized form leases, mean that landlords place tenants in a take it or
leave it situation. The increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing
further increases the landlord's bargaining power and escalates the need
for maintaining and improving the existing stock.5'
Hence, one of the main rationales for tenants' formal legal protections is that
significant power imbalances between landlords and tenants produce market
imperfections that make fredom of contract untenable. In the few years following
Javins, almost every state adopted the implied warranty of habitability, either by
statute and/or common law. 2 In Massachusetts, the revolution began in 1967, three
years prior to Javins,when the state legislature passed chapter 239, Section 8A of
the Massachusetts General Law which permitted tenants to withhold rent if the
premises were "in violation of the standards of fitness for human habitation

48. The common law rule that treated the contractual obligations of landlords and tenants
independently of each other was based on the assumption that the rent was given in exchange for the
land itself not as consideration for a habitable dwelling. Judge Wright pointed out that this rule made
sense in an agrarian economy, but not in an urban society where tenants are interested in a suitable place
to live rather than in the land. Id. at 1077-78.
49. Id at 1079. Judge Wright cited the landmark case of Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
161 A.2d 69, 78 (N.J. 1960), which found that there is an unwaivable implied warranty of
merchantability when purchasing goods such as a car. The decision was based largely on the notion that
consumers were not in as good a position as manufacturers to discover potential defects. Judge Wright
found that the same rationale applied to tenants shopping for an apartment:
In dealing with major problems such as heating plumbing, electrical or structural defects,
the tenant's position corresponds precisely with 'the ordinary consumer who cannot be
expected to have the knowledge or even the opportunity to make adequate inspection of
mechanical instrumentalities, like automobiles, and to decide for himself whether they are
reasonably fit for the designed purpose.'
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079 (citing Henningson, 161 A.2d at 78).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See SINGER, supra note 40, at 748.
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established under the state sanitary code."53 In order to withhold rent, Section 8A
required: (1) that violations of the state sanitary code "endanger[ed] or materially
54
impair[ed] the health or safety or well-being of persons occupying the premises,"
(2) that the tenant gave the landlord written notice of his intentions to withhold rent
at a time when the tenant was completely current in rent payments, and (3) that a
report was issued by the board of health corroborating the tenant's claims." In 1973,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts greatly expanded the protections
embodied in Section 8A in the landmark case of Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway.56 The Hemingway court held that the common law provided an implied
warranty of habitability in every lease which entitled tenants to withhold rent if they
lived in an uninhabitable dwelling, regardless of whether or not they complied with
the statutory requirements of Section 8A. As was the case in Javins, the court was
clearly concerned with correcting the power imbalance that existed between
landlords and tenants. The belief that tenants could not adequately assert their own
interests underlay both the court's finding that the implied warranty "cannot be
waived by any provision in the lease or rental agreement"" and the court's
determination that the common law had to reflect the radically different
characterization of the relationship between landlord and tenant that was embodied
in the recent statutory changes made in this area of law."
Hemingway cleared the way for the creation of a number of formal substantive
legal protections for tenants in Massachusetts in the years that followed. Since
Hemingway, tenants have been given a number of options for dealing with code
violations that affect the tenant's health, safety, and well-being. For example, they
may legally withhold rent, 9 sue the landlord for damages,' or make repairs

53. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 8A (1995).
54. § 8A.
55. See § 8A.
56. 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass 1973).
57. Id. at 843.
58. See id at 841 (stating that "the Legislature's actions reflect a characterization of the landlordtenant relationship that radically differs from the status accorded to it by the common law*).
59. In order to legally withhold rent, the following conditions must be met:
1. The landlord or the landlord's agent must be aware of the sanitary code violations before the
rent withholding begins. If the conditions existed at the inception of the tenancy, then the
landlord is deemed to have knowledge. Written notice from the Board of Health or any agency
with the authority to inspect is considered proof of knowledge.
2. The tenant must not have caused the sanitary code violations.
3. The Code violations must be capable of being repaired without the tenant vacating the
premises.
4. The premises must not be in a hotel or motel.
See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 8A (1995).

60. Under the law, a tenant is entitled to recover as damages the difference between the agreed upon
rent and the fair value of the premises in its sub-standard condition. The tenant is entitled to an
abatement from the time the landlord ismade aware of the conditions until they are remedied. A tenant
cannot unilaterally abate his or her own rent. Either the tenant and landlord must agree on an amount
or the court will determine the amount by applying the above formula. See MASs. GEN. L. ch. 239, §
8A (1995).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/5

14

Kurtzberg and Henikoff: Kurtzberg: Freeing the Parties from the Law:
1997]

Landlord/TenantMediation

themselves and deduct the amount from their rent." Furthermore, a combination of
statutory, regulatory, and judicial reforms led to a prohibition against retaliatory
eviction,' restrictions on the landlord's right to access to the apartment, 63 the
creation of an absolute right for tenants to obtain an inspection for alleged violations
of the state sanitary code," the application of consumer protection laws to
Uprofessional landlords",6' the advent of rent control,66 the application of strict
liability to the warranty of habitability,67 and the creation of strict laws regulating
how security deposits and first and last month's rent payments are to be collected
and held.6s These potential defenses and counterclaims provide tenants with a

61. Tenants may make repairs themselves and deduct the amount from their rent if the following
conditions are met:
1. The landlord was notified in writing from the Board of Health or a comparable agency that
sanitary code violations exist which *materially endanger the health and safety" of the tenants.
2. The landlord has failed to begin making repairs within five days of receiving the inspection
report.
3. The landlord has failed to substantially complete the repairs within a 14 day period (unless the
Board of Health specifies a shorter period).
§ 127L (1995).
See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 11l,
62. Under Massachusetts law, it is illegal for a landlord or his or her agent to threaten or to take
retaliatory action against a tenant who has notified the landlord or his agent of state sanitary code
violations that exist on the premises, organized or joined a tenants' union or organization, or taken any
other lawful action designed to bring the landlord into compliance with any federal, state, or local law
regulating the landlord-tenant relationship. Rent increases and eviction actions that occur within six
months of any of the aforementioned actions are presumed under the law to be retaliatory unless the
landlord can present "clear and convincing evidence" that the action was independently justified and
would have taken place in the exact same time and manner had the tenant not engaged in the protective
action. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 18 (1995).
63. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 15B(l)(a) (1995).
64. See generally, MASS. REGs. CODE tit. 105, § 400.001 (1996). There is no requirement that the
landlord be present for the inspection or be informed in advance that the inspection is to take place.
65. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93A, §§ 1,2, 9 (1978). Consumer protection laws are very protective
because they provide for treble damages when professional landlords knowingly violate the State
Sanitary Code.
66. In Massachusetts, rent control was enacted in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline. In November
of 1994, the citizens of Massachusetts voted to eliminate rent control in a state wide referendum
("Proposition 9"). See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 400 §§ 1-6 (1996). Shortly thereafter, Governor William Weld
signed an emergency declaration establishing a statewide policy for ending rent control. See MA LEGIS
282 (1994). A resulting law suit challenging the validity of the referendum resolved by initiating a
gradual phase-out of rent control. Recently, the Cambridge City Council voted to re-enact rent control.
None of the courts we examined in Section Five of this paper (Plymouth, Quincy, Northampton, and
Bingham) were subject to rent control.
67. See Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d 981 (Mass. 1979) (holding that tenant's
obligation to pay rent abates when the landlord has notice that the premises fail to comply with the
requirements of the warranty of habitability and that the landlord's lack of fault and reasonable efforts
to repair do not entitle the landlord to full rent any sooner).
68. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 186, § 15B (1995) (requiring landlords to provide tenants with a written
receipt and a written statement of conditions of the premises upon acceptance of a security deposit, to
deposit the security deposit in a separate interest-bearing account which cannot be intermingled with the
landlord's personal funds, to provide the tenant with an annual accounting and payment of interest, and
to use the security deposit only at the end of the tenancy (unless the tenant gives express permission to
use it during the tenancy for specifically designated purposes). Similar rules apply for advanced
collection of the last month's rent. See § 15B. Willful violation of these statutes by a landlord "in the
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variety of effective legal responses to an eviction action for nonpayment of rent. In
the end, if the landlord owes the tenant more for his violations of the appropriate
safety and health violations than the tenant owes in back rent, then the tenant cannot
be legally evicted.69
The revolution granted tenants significant procedural protections as well.

Most notably, uself-help" evictions became illegal and were replaced with formalized
asummary procedures" intended to provide "relatively fast judicial determination of
a landlord's claim of a right to regain possession of her property."70 These new
procedures provided tenants with a reasonable level of due process protections to
avoid unjust evictions and the potentially violent encounters inherent in a self-help
approach. In order to legally evict a tenant under the Massachusetts Uniform
Summary Process ("summary process") rules, a landlord must: (1) properly notify
the tenant that he or she is terminating the tenancy by giving a written notice called
a notice to quit; (2) get a judgment from a court that he or she may legally take
possession of the premises; and (3) get a court order called an execution which
enables the landlord to act on the judgment and physically move the tenant out with
the help of a constable, if necessary.
Summary process procedures allow tenants to prolong the process by filing for
discovery," transferring the case to Housing Court,' applying for a stay of

trade or business" of renting apartment units can give rise to a claim under consumer protection laws for

damages worth three times the value of the security deposit or last month's rent. See MASS. GEN. L. ch.
93A, §§ 1, 2, and 9 (1995).
69. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239, § 8A (1995).
70. See SINGER, supra note 40, at 695. In Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Uniform Summary
Process Rules were enacted in 1980 and were designed to accommodate two competing principles: the
landlord's interest in a speedy and inexpensive procedure for resolving eviction actions and the tenant's
fundamental need for dwellings that are habitable and secure. Mass. Unif. Sumn. Process R. 1, (1995).
71. Massachusetts Uniform Summary Process Rule 7 entities both parties to obtain discovery from
the other party through written interrogatories, requested for admissions, and/or requests for the
production of documents. Filing a demand for discovery automatically postpones the trial date two
weeks from the original trial date. See MASS. UNIF. SuMM. PROCESS R. 7 (b). In practice, the delay often
lasts longer, depending on how long it takes the landlord to respond to the discovery requests. Of
course, parties are not supposed to engage in discovery solely for purposes of delay. However, it is safe
to say that the extra time that discovery provides tenants is often part of what motivates tenants'
advocates to file for discovery even in seemingly straight-forward cases.
72. Massachusetts Uniform Summary Process Rule 4 entitles any party to transfer a summary process
action from the District Court to the Housing Court (ifthere is a Housing Court in that jurisdiction) upon
filing a motion for transfer. A motion for transfer can be filed the day before the trial is scheduled. Most
tenants' advocates transfer all of their cases to Housing Court for three reasons: (1) the judges in Housing
Court tend to know the law better because all they do is housing cases, (2) the judges at Housing Court
are usually more pro-tenant than the judges at the District Court, and (3) transfer usually postpones the
date of the trial. See LEGAL SERvicEs CENTER, EVICTION HANDBOOK FOR TENANTS 11 (1992) (on file
with authors); Bertling Interview, supra note 6.
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execution,' and filing for appeal, if they have good faith, non-frivolous arguments.'

The rules require an eviction to take a minimum of forty-seven days from the time
the notice to quit is filed to the time the sheriff can forcibly move a tenant out.75 As
one tenants' handbook indicated, "[e]victions are not easy and can be expensive if
a landlord fails to follow the law and a tenant knows and enforces her rights." 76

Unfortunately, there is good reason to believe that tenants are not aware of their
rights--both substantively and procedurally. In spite of strong anecdotal evidence
of the prevalence of sanitary code violations," the data indicates that tenants rarely
assert their rights. For example, in 1995 summary process cases in Plymouth,
Hingham, Northampton, and Quincy District Courts tenants waived all of their
possible legal defenses and counterclaims by failing to file an answer 72% of the

73. Sections 9 and 10 of the Massachusetts General Laws allow the court to stay the execution if(1)
no rent is owed, the tenant is not at fault for the eviction, and the tenant has been unable to find a new
place to live after making a bona fide effort, (2) the tenant is sixty years of age or older or handicapped,
or (3) in cases of special hardship. The court can grant the tenant extra time - sometimes several months
- to find a new place. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239, §§ 9 & 10 (1995).
74. Massachusetts Uniform Summary Process Rule 12 allows parties to appeal within 10 days from
the entry ofjudgment. This can further delay the eviction process for approximately six months. While
parties are required to post a bond for the amount of the judgment against them, indigent parties can get
the bond waived. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 239 § 5 (1995).
75. The rules require fourteen days to pass before a tenancy can be terminated for nonpayment of
rent (i.e., the notice to quit lasts fourteen days); a summons and complaint can be served on the tenant
on the fifteenth day, see Massachusetts Uniform Summary Process Rule 2; the complaint can be filed
with the court by the twenty-second day, see id; the tenant has until the twenty-ninth day to file an
answer, see Massachusetts Uniform Summary Process Rule 3; the trial can be held no earlier than the
thirty-second day, see Massachusetts Uniform Summary Process Rule 2 (c); judgment cannot enter until
the thirty-third day, see Massachusetts Uniform Summary Process Rule 10 (d); the execution cannot be
granted until the forty-fourth day, see Massachusetts Hood Summary Process Rule 13; the sheriff must
serve a 48-hour notice of eviction one day after the execution; and after the 48 hours have expired-on
the forty-seventh day-the sheriff can move the tenant out. The rules make it illegal to forcibly evict a
tenant in less time than forty-seven days. See. A. DuKE, LEGAL TACTICS: SELF-DEFENSE FOR TENANTS
IN MASSACHUSETrS, app. at 218-19 (A. Duke, Ed. 5th Edition, 1993) [hereinafter LEGAL TACTICS].
76. PETER SCHACK, Evictions, in LEGAL TACTICS, supra note 75, at 207. The usual costs of an
eviction include: 1) the fee to file the case in court, which is approximately $140 as of the date of this
publication; 2) fees for hiring a constable or deputy sheriff to serve court papers on the tenant, (MASS.
GlEN. L. ch. 262, § 8A; 3) attorney's fees, which often run over $500 (more if the case is appealed); and
4) fees for the constable to actually evict the tenant and for movers to move and store the tenant's
belongings, which often costs as much as $2,000. See id. at 231 n.1 (providing updated figures for
1996). Because tenants are often unaware that landlords have to pay these costs, they are often unaware
of the bargaining power they may actually have. For instance, if tenants were aware that landlords had
to pay close to $2,000 to have a constable evict them, they might realize that they have more leverage
when negotiating than they originally thought.
77. See Bertling Interview, supra note 6.
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time. s Moreover, tenants filed "informed answers" in only 15.6% of the summary
process cases heard in these three courts. 79
The dangers highlighted by the critics of mediation are of serious concern in
cases where uninformed, unrepresented tenants are mediating with sophisticated,
represented landlords. The formal protections embodied in the law are due in large
part to the recognition that tenants and landlords have unequal bargaining power in
the market for housing. If mediation allows tenants to unwittingly waive those
protections, it is likely that justice is not being done.

IV. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS
While there is much to be learned from the critique, it is fundamentally flawed
in two important respects. First, it compares a real-world model of mediation to an
idealized model of adjudication. A comparison of mediation to its real-life
alternatives, even in the suspect area of landlord-tenant cases, reveals that
alternatives to mediation deal less adequately with power imbalances than mediation
does. Second, the critique takes a narrow view of the role of "the law" in mediation,
erroneously assuming that mediators always view the law as an obstacle to creative
agreements and, therefore, choose to ignore it. While some mediators may take this
view,' many choose to incorporate the law into mediation. However, they do so not
only as a means to provide parties with the formal "protections" that society has
bestowed upon them, but also to enable parties to make a fully informed choice
about what is best for them. Thus, mediation often incorporates the law in an
attempt to allow the parties to "go beyond" the law--to both fully understand the law
and to decide for themselves whether the parties can accept the principles underlying
it or wish to replace those principles with others they find more compelling. In
failing to recognize this, the critics fail to recognize mediation's true potential.
A. ComparingMediation to Its Real-Life Alternatives
Critics of mediation tend to compare it to a romanticized notion of formal
adjudication. Images of adjudication's largest success stories, such as Brown v.
Board of Education,s" are typically conjured up and juxtaposed to mediation's

78. The breakdown for each court was as follows:
cor
Answers Filed/Total Cases
Informed Answers/Total Cases
Hingham
49/172 (28.5%)
23/172 (13.4%)
Plymouth
77/257 (30.0%)
39/257 (15.2%)
Quincy
291/1073 (27.1%)
157/1073 (14.6%)
Northampton
120/416 (28.9%)
81/416 (19.5%)
TOTAL:
537/1918 (28.0%)
300/1918 (15.6%)
79. For an explanation of the criteria used to distinguish between "informed answers" and
"uninformed answers', see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 3 and 19 and accompanying text.
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); reargued 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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greatest nightmares.8 2 This comparison obscures the often harsh realities of our
system of adjudication for the poor and underprivileged. In considering whether
mediation harms the poor and disempowered, we must not compare it to an idealized
vision of uformal justice," but rather to its real-life alternatives of negotiated
settlements and litigated cases.
The notion of the poor tenant who is protected by a strong advocate who
eloquently asserts a multitude of formal legal defenses and counterclaims to eviction
on the tenant's behalf, thereby ensuring a fair and just outcome is mocked by the
realities of the formal legal system. An examination of all of the 1995 summary
process cases 3 in four separate Massachusetts district courts (Quincy, Plymouth,
Hingham, and Northampton) reveals that adjudication's so-called formal protections
for the poor and disempowered rarely amount to considerable protection in practice.
The reality is that many of the power imbalances described in the critique of
mediation also have an adverse impact on litigated cases. For example, while 81.8%
of landlords in our sample were either represented by counsel or were experienced
repeat players, only 8.1% of tenants had attorneys and none were repeat players. 4
Without the benefit of legal counsel, tenants frequently forfeited their formal legal
protections by failing to assert them. In 71.7% of the cases examined, tenants
waived all of their defenses and counterclaims prior to trial by failing to file an
answer."s To make matters worse, 38.2% of the few answers that were actually filed
were "uninformed" in that they raised no real defenses or counterclaims at all.8 6

82. See Fiss, supra note 10, at 1089 (citing Brown as a prime example of how adjudication helps
bring about justice in ways that settlement cannot); see also Edwards, supra note 2, at 679.
83. There were a total of 1,918 cases in the four courts combined, with the breakdown being as
follows:
Court
# of Cases
Quincy
1,073
416
Northampton
257
Plymouth
Hingham
172
84. Landlords were represented by counsel in 63.6% of the cases observed (1220 out of 1918). Of
the remaining 36.4%, approximately half (349 out of the remaining 698 cases) involved landlords who
were repeat players-either real estate corporations, partnerships, housing authorities, or professional
landlords whose names repeatedly appeared on the docket lists.
85. Tenants filed answers in 537 out of 1918 total cases. This includes all cases in our sample, not
simply those that went to trial.
86. We examined each of the 537 answers filed by tenants and evaluated each of them on the basis
of the defenses and counterclaims asserted, labeling them either "informed" or "uninformed." While
there is some degree of subjectivity involved in such an evaluation system, most of the answers were
either very informed or very uninformed and fit very clearly into one of the two categories. Generally,
any answer that raised significant legal defenses or counterclaims was considered an informed answer.
Most informed answers were either written by attorneys or were form answers taken from a "pro se
packet" distributed by various Legal Services Centers in Massachusetts and copied from LEGAL TACTICs.
Some were simply narratives written by the tenant which described various code violations. To be
considered an uninformed answer, an answer had to be extremely uninformed. Many uninformed
answers were completely blank, while others literally raised no legal defenses or counterclaims.
Typically, uninformed answers simply said something to the effect of, "I can't afford to pay right now,
but I would like to." If there was any question about whether a given answer was informed or
uninformed, the default position was that an answer would be considered informed.
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Essentially, only 15.6% of tenants filed an answer that effectively served to assert
their legal rights. 7 Furthermore, in spite of the fact that filing for discovery
automatically postpones the trial date two weeks,8" only 12.0% of the tenants in our
sample availed themselves of this opportunity."9 Finally, tenants were so intimidated
by and/or fearful of going to court that they defaulted 31.3% of the time.'
As might be expected, the results from adjudicated cases mirror the above
imbalances in power. For example, in all summary process cases which were
decided by a formal hearing or trial, the landlord was granted possession of the
premises 96.9% of the time.9

While tenants raised counterclaims in 38.9% of the cases that went to trial,
abatement of rent to reflect housing code violations was ordered in only 4.9% of the
cases.' Although courts have the power to order the landlord to do repairs when
sanitary code violations exist, not a single landlord was ordered to do repairs in all
of 1995 in any of the four courts observed.
While the above data might suggest that few conditions or problems exist or
that the negligible abatement rate follows from landlords repairing the defects that

87. Tenants filed informed answers in 300 out of 1918 cases examined. The breakdown by court
was as follows:
Cour
# of Informed Answers
%of Cases with Informed Answers
Quincy
157/1073
14.6%
Northampton
81/416
19.5%
Plymouth
39/257
15.2%
Hingham
23/172
13.4%
88. See MASS. UNIF. SuMM. PROCESS R. 7 (b); supra note 71 and accompanying text.
89. Tenants filed for discovery in 179 out of 1489 cases examined. This sample includes data from
Quincy and Northampton District Courts. The breakdown by court was as follows:
Court
# of Cases Discovery Filed
%of Cases Discovery Filed
Quincy
113/1073
10.5%
Northampton
66/416
15.90/
Data from the Plymouth and Hingham District Courts regarding discovery was not collected.
90. Tenants defaulted in 601 out of 1918 cases examined. The breakdown by court was as follows:
Court
# of Cases Defaulted
%of Cases Defaulted
Quincy
341/1073
31.8%
Northampton
114/416
27.4%
Plymouth
80/257
31.1%
Hingham
66/172
38.4%
91. Landlords were granted possession in 157 out of 162 trials. Tenants were granted possession in
the remaining 5 cases. The breakdown by court was as follows:
Possession for Landlord:
Possession for Tenant:

Court

# of Cases

%of Cases

# of Cases

Quincy
102/106
96.2%
4/106
3.8%
Northampton 42/43
97.7%
1/43
2.3%
Plymouth
9/9
100.0%
0/9
0.0%
Hingham
4/4
100.0%
0/4
0.0/0
92. The breakdown by court was as follows:
Court
# of Cases Counterclaims Filed # of Cases Counterclaims Prevailed
Quincy
37/106 trials
4/37 (10.8%)
Northampton
20/43 trials
4/20 (20.0%)
Plymouth
3/9 trials
0/3 (0.0%)
Hingham
3/4 trials
0/3 (0.0%)
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prompted tenants' complaints, anecdotal evidence and common sense suggest
otherwise. One clerk-magistrate explained that the trend over the last two or three
years in judging summary process cases has been towards not recognizing tenants'
defenses. He attributes this to a philosophical shift "towards the right" which leads
judges to refuse to recognize defenses and counterclaims concerning conditions
when the conditions are first complained about after the notice to quit is filed. Often,
judges "believe that [the conditions] are not the real reason why tenants are
withholding rent; they think that [the conditions] are just a rationalization for not
paying the rent given after-the-fact." 9 This particular clerk-magistrate went as far
as to say that he often tells tenants, "You know, you have some excellent defenses
under the law, but the history of this court is not to recognize them."" Moreover,
tenants' lawyers confirm that housing conditions are typically a problem for their
clients. As one tenants' lawyer stated, "well over 90% of the potential tenants that
come through my door have substantial problems with conditions. About one-third
of them don't complain about it when you ask them... but further probing [through
specific questions] reveals considerable problems.9 While not all eviction cases
involve apartments with deplorable conditions, anecdotal evidence indicates that
many do."
In many ways, it is unrealistic to look at litigated cases as the main alternative
to mediation. As is the case in most areas of law, most housing cases are not
resolved at trial. In fact, only 8.4% of the cases from our sample were decided by
a judge after a trial or hearing. In reality, the primary alternative to mediation is
negotiated settlement. Negotiated settlements present even greater risks of
exploitation of the poor and disempowered than does mediation. While mediation's
focus on "process checks" to remedy power imbalances may be inadequate, as the
critics suggest,' negotiated settlement leaves those same power imbalances
completely unchecked. It is not surprising, therefore, that 99.9% of non-mediated
negotiated settlements granted possession to the landlord.9
In short, the real-life alternatives to mediation present a harsh and
unsympathetic option for tenants, which is a far cry from the ideal picture of formal
justice offered by the critics. In the end, in all cases that went to trial or that were

93. Interview with Clerk-Magistrate X (March 8, 1996). If the clerk-magistrate is correct, then the
judges are intentionally disregarding the law. There is nothing in Massachusetts landlord-tenant law that
authorizes judges not to enforce valid defenses or counterclaims simply because they are first raised after
the notice to quit is filed. For obvious reasons, we wish to keep the identity of this clerk-magistrate
anonymous. Therefore, all quotes to him will be attributed to "Clerk-Magistrate X."
94. Id.
95. Bertling Interview, supra note 6.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
98. Out of 700 non-mediated settlements from the four courts observed, only one granted possession
to the tenant-and it did so contingently upon the tenant meeting the terms of a payment plan. This
single exception came out of Northampton District Court. This excludes approximately sixteen
agreements in which the cases were dismissed. In these cases, it is not clear who effectively was granted
possession.
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settled without mediation, the landlord was granted possession 99.6% of the time."

B. The Role of the Law in Mediation:
Embracingthe Law So As to Move Beyond It
The second fundamental flaw of the critique lies in its narrow view of the role
of uthe law" in mediation. The critics charge that mediators' primary emphasis on
"self-determination" and on agreements "tailored" to the needs and interests of the
parties leads them to ignore objective standards of fairness such as the formal law.
While it is true that many mediators ignore the law, the critics generally fail to
recognize that many other mediators do incorporate the law into the mediation
process to ensure that the parties make informed, fair decisions. Mediators
employing the law into mediation often consider the law to be neither controlling nor
irrelevant, but rather a germane reference point that enables the parties to reach a
truly fair agreement:
Where law controls, it can usurp the parties' sense of fairness. Where it
is ignored, the parties miss any value that it might have in aiding them to
reach a fair agreement. A third option exists. Given the appropriate
attitude on the part of the parties and the mediator, law can play a role in
the process where it is neither used as a club nor disregarded. Rather, law
is considered a relevant factor ....[T]he mediator can help the parties
consider law not primarily as a set of necessary applied rules, but as
providing a relevant reference point, both in terms of a practical

99. In non-mediated cases pursued tojudgment, 1481 out of 1487 resulted in ajudgment for the
landlord for possession. Tenants were granted possession in only 6 out of 1487 cases. The breakdown
by court was as follows:
Possession for Landlord:
Possession for Tenant:

Cm

# ofCases

%ofCases

#of Ces

Quincy
861/865
99.5%
4/865
0.5%
Northampton 306/307
99.7%
1/307
0.3%
Plymouth
115/116
99%
1/116
0.5%
Hingham
118/118
100%
0/118
0.0%
This accounts for all cases, whether they were litigated or settled out of court without mediators,
in which a judgment for possession was made. Therefore, it excludes all cases which were dismissed
or transferred, which account for 18.0% of all cases. The court files revealed that the overwhelming
majority of the dismissed cases-69.6% of them-involved voluntary dismissals by the landlords, in most
instances because the tenant moved out or paid the back rent. 10.0% of the dismissed cases were by
stipulation. While some of the stipulated dismissals were clearly tenant 'victories"--e.g., the landlord
agreed to dismiss in response to the defendant's counterclaims-most ofthem were due to agreements
in which the tenants agreed to vacate or pay the back rent. Only 2.2% of the dismissed cases were
involuntary dismissals, such as agranted motion to dismiss by the tenant. The remaining 18.2% were
"no-shows" which were typically due to the tenant having agreed to vacate or pay the back rent.
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alternative and as an expression of societal norms and, perhaps, some
underlying principles.'"o
The critics act as if mediators are faced with a choice between either ignoring
the law completely or imposing it on the parties.'"' They fail to see that a third
option exists, perhaps because so many mediators fail to see this as well. This third
mediation approach attempts to "free the parties from the law" by embracing it and
enabling the parties to both fully understand it and to decide for themselves whether
they accept or reject its underlying principles.0 2
Mediation's promise to contextualize conflict offers parties at least two things
that adjudication cannot: empowerment and the potential for mutual
understanding."W Adjudication, even when idealized, achieves ufair outcomes" at the
expense of empowerment; it decontextualizes conflict by treating parties as proxies
for classes of individuals"° and applying objectively "fair"pre-determined outcomes.
Mediation, on the other hand, empowers parties by responding to their individualized
needs, encouraging them to speak for themselves, and demanding that they come up
with their own creative solutions to their problems. By applying objective rules to
every conflict and encouraging legal representatives to handle all communications,
adjudication generally discourages parties from attempting to understand each other.
Mediation, on the other hand, encourages each party to recognize and acknowledge
the other party's situation, even though their needs and interests may, in the end,

100. THE CENTER FOR MEDIATION INLAw, THE PLACE OF LAW IN MEDIATION, Memo No. 6 (1983)
(training materials).
101. For example, Professor Bryan explains at the outset of her article the kind of mediation her
critique is directed at: "[In] the mediation model I contemplate ... [s]ubstantive law does not control
the ... settlement's terms. Rather the mediator encourages the couple to design an agreement that
reflects their particular needs and interests." Bryan, supranote 2, at 447-48 (emphasis added). As she
proceeds with her argument, however, it becomes clear that she equates this model of mediation with
one that completely ignores the law. For instance, she later writes that, ".. .mediators concerned with
fairness cannot use substantive legal norms to balance power and assure outcomes that, at least,
somewhat reflect society's perception ofjustice." Id. at 505 (emphasis added). Professor Bryan fails
to recognize the possibility that mediation can use substantive legal norms, without having them control
the terms of the settlement.
102. The notion of'freing the parties from the law," which also appears in our title, came out of our
conversations with Gary J. Friedman. Telephone Interview with Gary J. Friedman (April 3, 1996)
("Friedman Interview).
103. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency andProtection,or Empowerment and Recognition?: The
Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REv. 253 (1989) (arguing that
mediation's unique powers lie in its ability to empower parties and enable them to reach some degree
of mutual understanding).
104. It is a common view of adjudication that it treats parties as representatives of classes of actors
and that judges consider the broad societal implications of their decisions and not just the individual
circumstances of the parties involved. See id. at 268 n.42; RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAw 18-19 (2d ed. 1977).
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remain opposed.' °5 There is value in achieving such empathy and mutual
understanding, even if no final agreement is reached in the end.
These potential benefits of mediation do not come without risk, however. If
mediation fails to correct large existing power imbalances, the process risks
becoming a forum for the oppression of the poor and disempowered. Almost all
mediators recognize that mediation is both dangerous and inappropriate in cases
involving large power imbalances." ° Hence, general consensus exists in the
mediation community that divorce cases involving histories of abuse should not be
mediated, and most programs attempt to "screen out" cases involving the kinds of
power disparities typical of abusive relationships.0 7 Likewise, most mediators
consider themselves ethically bound to terminate a mediation in which they feel that
one party is unable to effectively assert himself or herself.
The critics, however, want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. When
done properly, mediation can adequately address power imbalances in most cases by
making sure that parties are aware of their rights and are therefore able to make
informed choices about if, when, and how to assert them. Moreover, mediators can
use a variety of techniques to ensure that the process is fair and not contaminated by
serious power imbalances.0 8 Finally, when possible, mediators should screen out
cases involving very large power disparities and terminate mediation where such
power imbalances emerge, These actions minimize the risks associated with
mediation, enabling its potential benefits to outweigh its potential costs in the
majority of cases.

V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
In this section we explore the substantive goals of mediation programs which
incorporate the law into their procedures and compare these program's aspirations
to those of other conflict resolution processes such as court and traditional
community mediation programs. While traditional court processes tend to focus

105. See Bush, supra note 103, at 269; Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-ItsForms andFunctions,44 S.

CAL. L. REv. 305, 325 (1971) ("The central quality of mediation [is] its capacity to reorient the parties
to each other... by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a
perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.").
106. See generally, Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth'sStory: ExploringPowerImbalances in Divorce

Mediation, 8 GEo. J.LEGAL ETHICS 553 (1995).
107. See e.g., Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: ScreeningforDomestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 43 (1995) (arguing that mediation programs have a responsibility to screen cases for abuse
to determine whether mediation is appropriate).
108. See Albie Davis and Richard A. Salem, Dealing with Power Balances in the Mediation of

InterpersonalDisputes,6 MEDIATION Q. 17, 20-21 (1994) (suggesting ten techniques that mediators can
use to address power imbalances which range from "interrupting intimidating negotiating patterns" to

.watch[ing] to see that one party does not settle out of fear of violence" and "encourag[ing] the parties
to share knowledge').
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exclusively on rights and community mediation programs tend to focus on interests,
many of the mediation approaches we have studied try to focus on both factors.
Although in practice this dual focus is often difficult to maintain, our research has
led us to conclude that a balance of interests and rights is both possible and desirable.
After discussing the substantive goals of the various dispute resolution processes, we
next briefly outline three of the procedural "principles" recognized as important
within the mediation field: neutrality, self-determination, and informed consent.
Lastly, we explore the tension which exists between preserving neutrality and selfdetermination while ensuring that the parties are adequately informed.
B. SubstantiveAnalysis: Rights v. Interests Based Processes
Dispute resolution approaches are typically described as either "interest-based"
or "rights based" with the implicit assumption being that a process may not
incorporate both factors effectively. As a result, many mediators erroneously
assume that an inverse relationship exists between "rights-based" and "interest
based" approaches: the more that a certain procedure focuses on one factor (i.e.,
interests or rights), the less it focuses on the other."° A symbolic representation
of this concept would be a single axis with "interest based" processes on one side and
"rights based" processes on the other. [See Figure One.]
Despite the traditional focus of many dispute resolution processes on either
interests or rights, we believe that it is possible to design an approach which focuses
on both of these important factors."'
It is possible to create a graph which illustrates the substantive focus of the
various dispute resolution processes available to individuals. The horizontal axis
represents the level at which the process focuses on the interests of the parties, while
the vertical axis represents the importance of parties' legal rights and entitlements in
the resolution process. [See Figure Two.] Quadrant Two of the graph represents
those processes which focus mainly on the rights of the parties and pay little
attention to the individual's particular interests and concerns. It is descriptive of
many traditional dispute resolution processes such as litigation.I" Quadrant Four of
the graph represents those processes which focus mainly on the interests of the
parties and avoid discussion of the law relevant to the dispute. It is descriptive of
many "interest-based" community mediation programs. Quadrant One of the graph
represents processes used to resolve disputes which focus neither on rights nor

109. See Harvard Mediation Program Basic Mediation Training Materials, Fall 1995.
110. Negotiation scholars have observed a similar tendency for individuals to focus exclusively on
either interests or rights during negotiations generally. See ROBERT MNooKIN et. al., BARGAINING IN
THE SHADOW OF THE LAW: THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR (Forthcoming) (arguing that negotiation is
most effective when conducted at both the interests and rights "tables").
111. Although many advocates would argue that they are concerned about their clients' interests, we
consider litigation to be a traditionally rights-focused process as legal determinations are generally based
on the parties' legal rights and entitlements, not their particular needs or concerns.
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interests and probably best symbolizes processes whereby a dispute is resolved
through force or power. "2
Traditional dispute resolution processes such as litigation mainly focus on the
individuals' legal rights or entitlements. Although some forms of alternative dispute
'
resolution, such as arbitration, are similarity "rights-based,"" many of the other
processes currently used by third party neutrals try to focus discussion more on the
parties' interests - those concerns and needs which are personally important to them
-- than on their legal entitlements.
An "interest-based" mediation approach may be appropriate in those
circumstances where either (1) parties are already aware of their legal rights and
responsibilities, or (2) the interests of the parties are much more important to the
parties themselves than their legal entitlements. Often community mediators
working in small claims courts will question parties to see whether they are primarily
concerned with settling their dispute or with having a legal determination
rendered." 4 Many cases exist, however, in which the parties are not independently
knowledgeable about their rights and entitlements, and in which they do consider the
law to be extremely relevant to the resolution of their dispute.
In such circumstances, "interest-based" mediators find themselves in a difficult
situation. In essence, their only options are to either: (1) refer the parties to lawyers
(which often is not a realistic option due to financial or time constraints), or (2)
provide the parties with enough information regarding the "interest-based" mediation
process so that the parties may make an informed decision as to whether they wish
to continue to mediate their case or return to court where the bulk of the discussion
will be focused on rights and entitlements. In such circumstances, parties are not
given the opportunity to pursue a resolution process which looks at both the interests
and rights of the individuals involved.
Many mediation programs have begun to strive to provide parties with a dispute
resolution process which is both rights and interest-based. In essence, by explicitly
incorporating the law into an "interest based" template of mediation, these programs
hope to provide an arena in which those parties who either do not know their legal
rights and entitlements, or feel that the law is central to their dispute, may still
attempt to craft a negotiated agreement which better suits their individual interests
than the judgement which would be rendered by the court.

112. For example, although distasteful, war and other uses of physical force are processes of
resolving disputes which do not forcus either on the parties' interests or legal entitlements.

113. There are also "rights-based" mediation programs which attempt to mirror the outcomes acourt
would produce. Such programs are not the subject of the critique enumerated in Section One and are

therefore not the main focus of this article.

114. For example, in its Basic Mediation Training, which prepares community mediators to work
in small claims courts, the Harvard Mediation Program advises trainees to openly question parties who
seem focused on legal arguments and "the law." Typical questions and statements include "Do you think
the law is extremely relevant to your case?," "Are you concerned with getting some kind of legal
determination?," and "Ifyou think these legal arguments are the most important issues surrounding your
dispute, you might want to consider going back to court."
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There are two levels on which the success of such ambitious mediation
programs may be evaluated. First, although substantively, each of these programs
would like to be identified as being located in Quadrant Three of the graph -representing processes which focus both on rights and interests -- the issue still
remains of which point in Quadrant Three best describes the program. Although
different programs may each attempt to incorporate law into the mediation process,
their method of doing so dramatically affects how well the process enables the
parties to consider both their interests and rights when crafting a final agreement.
For example, a mediation process which either explicitly or implicitly frames
the law as the most important piece of criteria which the parties should consider may
effectively focus the parties on their rights, however, this might be accomplished at
the expense of some of the parties's interests."' This approach of incorporating law
into the mediation process may place the program nominally in Quadrant Three,
however, it is most likely that the exact point representing the program would be in
the northwest section closest to Quadrant Two. Alternatively, a different program
which encourages the mediators to provide legal information if the parties
specifically ask for it may also be nominally in Quadrant Three, however, the exact
location of such a program would probably be closest to the southeast section
bordering Quadrant Four. The closer a program can get to the Northeast section of
Quadrant Three, the more successful it is at effectively providing the parties with the
opportunity to effectively focus on both their interests and their rights during the
mediation process. Although probably practically unattainable, the most northeast
point in the Quadrant represents the ideal dispute resolution process. In evaluating
various program's attempts to create this ideal process, it is useful to analyze how
their various approaches affect the substance of the focus of the mediation process.
The second level on which different programs' success at incorporating the law
into mediation can be evaluated focuses on procedural issues. Although there has
been considerable debate in recent years over the development of a set of ethical
rules and canons for this emerging profession,"1 6 a few guiding "principles" are
universally recognized among scholars and practitioners in the field." 7 These
"principles" represent procedural goals which mediators strive to obtain in each
session with the parties regardless of the substance of the discussions. Some of the
most commonly recognized principles include: (1) neutrality, (2) self-determination,

115. Note that if parties to a mediation are led to believe that the law is the most important issue in
resolving their dispute, they might be convinced that it is best to settle on an agreement similar to the
judgment which would be rendered in court, even itfsuch agreement were not the best way to satisfy each
of their respective interests.
116. See Edward Sherman, Standards of ProfessionalConduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1995 J.DisP. RESOL. 95, 96.
117. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994) developed jointly by the

American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, and the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution; STANDARDS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE developed by the Massachusetts Association
of Mediation Programs ("MAMP"); ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF COURT-CONNECTED
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES (Proposed Draft 1995) developed by the Standing Committee on
Dispute Resolution of the Massachusetts Trial Court.
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and (3) informed consent. The next section briefly outlines each of these principles
and explores how the incorporation of the law into the mediation process potentially

threatens each of these important concepts.
C ProceduralAnalysis: The Principlesof Mediation
1. Introduction
Although a broad range of topics are often touched upon in discussions of
mediator ethics, the three principles mentioned above are common to most proposed
sets of ethical norms."' It is important to note, however, that while the terms

"neutrality,' "self-determination," and "informed consent" are ubiquitous within the

field, they are often used to represent very different concepts. For this reason, we
will first briefly provide an explanation of the defimition we would like to attach to
each of these concepts before turning to a more detailed analysis of how the
introduction of law into the mediation process potentially threatens each principle.
2. Neutrality
In this paper, the principle of neutrality is defined to consist of two equally
important components. The first -- objective neutrality -- describes the mediator's
obligation not to permit her own biases and feelings towards either of the disputants
to affect her ability to act in a fair, impartial manner during the mediation. Despite
the fact that mediators often empathize more strongly with one party than the other,
and sometimes even strongly dislike one of the individuals with whom they are
dealing, they have an ethical obligation to not let such emotions interfere with their
responsibilities as a mediator.
The second component -- subjective neutrality -- refers to how the parties
perceive the mediator's actions. Even if a mediator is operating in a completely
neutral fashion, it is possible that one of the parties may view her as biased, whether
for racial, gender, or other reasons. In order to establish and maintain the legitimacy
of the mediation process, it is extremely important that mediators constantly check
to make sure that their actions are not being perceived as biased by the parties."I9
Although most codes of mediator ethics do not explicitly talk of "objective" and

118. See e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CoNDuCr FOR MEDIATORS (1994), supra note 118. Standard

One reads that "AMediator Shall Recognize that Mediation is Based on the Principle of SelfDetermination by the Parties." In the comment regarding this standard, the code touches upon the
principle of informed consent by stating that although "[a] mediator cannot personally ensure that each
party has made a fully informed choice to reach a particular agreement ... it is good practice for the
mediator to make the parties aware of the importance of consulting other professionals, where
appropriate to help them make informed decisions." Standard Two states that "A Mediator Shall
Conduct the Mediation in an Impartial Manner," and Standard Five states that "A Mediator Shall
Maintain the Reasonable Expectations of the Parties with Regard to Confidentiality."
119. See Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability,

4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETIcs 503 (1991).
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"subjective" neutrality, the standards which they offer generally encompass both
principles. For example, the recently proposed Ethical Standards for the Provision
of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Services developed by the Massachusetts
Trial Courfs Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution states that "A neutral shall
provide dispute resolution services in an impartial manner. Impartiality means
freedom from favoritism and bias in conduct as well as appearance.""
The introduction of legal information into a mediation potentially threatens a
mediator's neutrality in a number of distinct ways.' First, each time that mediators
decide to provide parties with legal information, they are effectively dictating which
substantive legal issues should be put on the negotiating table.' " Although in many
cases it is fairly obvious which laws are relevant to the dispute at hand, in other
mediations a number of different statutes and regulations might exist which each
have a tenuous connection to the issues on the table. For example, it is common in
landlord/tenant mediation for the parties to discuss security deposit issues while
talking generally about rent payments. If the term "security deposit" comes up,
should the mediators immediately refer the parties to the very pro-tenant
Massachusetts laws which outline numerous scenarios in which a tenant is entitled
to receive three times their security deposit from their landlord?'23 Should the
mediator next focus the parties' attention on Massachusetts summary process
procedural law which states that tenant's rights to receive such compensation from
their landlords is forfeited if they have failed to file an answer to the original
complaint directly addressing the security deposit issue? 4 The decision by the
mediators of both which laws to introduce and the timing of such introductions can
have an extremely large impact upon the mediation process. Mediators making such
difficult decisions must be confident that their own biases and subjective feelings
towards the parties do not unduly influence their 2 choices regarding which
substantive legal information to provide to the parties.

120. ETHICAL. STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE
SERVICES, supra note 118, Standard IIIA (Proposed Draft 1995) (emphasis added).

RESOLUTION

121. See e.g., Tom Arnold, Mediator Ethics Issues in Mediation, C976 ALI-ABA 701, 724-25
(1994); Lela Love, Standards ofProfessional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. DIsp.
RESOL. 95, 106.

122. "Allowing a mediator to give either legal information or advice is controversial. Some
commentators believe that if a mediator isallowed to comment at all, personal bias may enter the process
in deciding which laws to reveal." Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed
Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 714 (1994).

123. See MASS.GEN. LAws ch. 186, § 15B (1995).
124. "Counterclaims shall be set forth in the defendant's answer and shall be expressly designated
as counterclaims. The right to counterclaim shall be deemed to be waived as to the pending action if
such a claim is not filed with the answer pursuant to Rule 3, unless the court shall otherwise order on

motion for cause shown." MASS.SUMM. PROCESS R. 5; see MASS.GEN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (1995).
125. The ability to provide substantive legal information to parties during a mediation significantly
increases a mediator's ability to influence the negotiation process. For example, a mediator who chooses
to inform parties of Massachusetts' security deposit law, but not of summary process procedural law
which dictates that tenants forfeit their rights if they fail to file an answer to the complaint, may

drastically alter the parties' perceptions of their court alternatives to mediation - thus greatly impacting
the negotiation process. Mediators' neutrality may be threatened if they allow personal biases and
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Many mediators who introduce substantive law to parties during a mediation
try to distinguish their actions from those typically conducted by lawyers by relying
on the nebulous distinction between providing "legal information" and providing
"legal advice." In discussing this distinction, one scholar noted that:
The pertinent distinction the mediator must make here is between giving
legal information and giving legal advice. The mediator may give legal
information, provided that he or she is qualified by training or experience
to provide it. This allows the mediator to advise all parties of laws that
are common knowledge and may be applicable to the dispute. For
example, it would seem that an experienced family mediator would know
of, and could provide, court-established child support guidelines. On the
other hand, mediators should avoid giving legal advice, such as how an
agreement might affect the participants' legal rights or obligations. 26
A mediator providing "legal information" might alert the parties to documents which
outline statutes and regulations which are related to their dispute, while a mediator
providing "legal advice" would interpret those laws for the parties and analyze how
they might be applied to the particular circumstances of the parties' dispute.
Although on a theoretical level these two concepts may be distinguishable, in
practice the line between them is very gray. 27 Anytime a mediator chooses to
introduce "legal information" into a mediation, interpretive implications surround her
decision. First, and most obviously, the mediator must have interpreted the law at
some level in order to determine that it was relevant to the dispute on the table.
Additionally, even if the mediator is simply sharing a statute or other piece of
"neutral information" with the parties, the manner in which the material is introduced
(e.g., how the mediator instructs the parties to think about the law in their decision
making process, the tone of voice used, etc.) often reveals some of the mediator's
own feelings regarding the relevance of the law to the discussion, potentially
threatening the perceived neutrality of the mediator in the eyes of the parties.
Even if a mediator could present legal information in a perfectly "neutral"
manner, it is likely that the content of the information provided may still lead one of
the parties to believe that the mediator is biased. An individual faced with
unfavorable law may feel that the mediator has purposely introduced information
which only helps the other side's arguments. 121 Some programs attempt to pre-empt
this challenge to mediators' neutrality, by having the mediators refer to a "neutral
source" of information or manual during the process, so that legal information
provided to parties during a mediation is perceived as coming from "the law," and

feelings to impact decisions regarding which laws to introduce.
126. Moberly, supra note 123, at 714.
127. See Love, supra note 122, at 106.
128. See Alison Smiley, Professional Codes and Neutral Lawyering: An Emerging Standard
Governing Nonrepresentational Attorney Mediation, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 213, 241 (1993).
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not the mediator.' 29 While such a system may ensure the parties that the legal
information which they are receiving is not fabricated, it does not solve all the
potential neutrality problems as parties may question the mediators' motives behind
their decisions regarding which sections of the manual to discuss.
As illustrated by this section, the introduction of substantive law into the
mediation process raises a number of complex issues regarding potential threats to
mediator neutrality. Mediators choosing to provide such information must be
extremely careful that their own feelings and emotions towards the parties do not
color their decisions regarding the timing and content of any substantive law to
which they refer. Additionally, mediators must also be conscious of how their
actions and the information which they are conveying to both sides is altering
disputants' perceptions of their role as a neutral third party in the resolution process.
3. Self-determination
The principle of self-determination is considered by many to be the defining
characteristic of the mediation process in comparison to other dispute resolution
mechanisms. 30 In contrast to litigation and arbitration procedures, no third party
imposes a final decision on the parties during a mediation. Each disputant is free to
decide for herself whether she wishes to accept any proposed offers which are on the
table. 3' At the heart of the principle of self-determination lies the assumption that
the parties understand and truly feel that their participation in the mediation process
is voluntary. First, it is important for individuals to realize that they need not
commit to anything as a result of the mediation and that alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms (e.g., court) are available to them. Additionally, in order to
fully uphold the self-determination mandate, mediators must be careful to prevent
any existing power imbalances in the parties' relationship from enabling one party

129. Mediators working with the non-profit organization Mediation Works, Inc. in Boston use an
.authoritative resource" when conducting summary process eviction mediation. This manual, which
contains (1) a summary of Massachusetts Residential Landlord/Tenant Law, (2) the State Sanitary Code,
(3) Chapter 93A Regulations, (4) Uniform Summary Process Rules, and (5) a compilation of
Massachusetts statutes is referred to by both mediators and parties when direct questions regarding the
law are asked. Doran Interview, supra note 6. See MEDIATION WORKS, INC. SUMMARY PROCESS
RESOURCE MANUAL; see also Donald Wechstein, Standards of ProfessionalConduct in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. DisP. RES. 95, 108.
130. "First, the primary purpose of mediation is to allow party self-determination and empowerment.
Virtually all the mediator ethical codes set forth self-determination as a major (often the major) principle
and goal of mediation." Robert Moberly, Standards of ProfessionalConduct in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1995 J. DISP. RES. 95, 117. Additionally, the "Model Standards of Conduct for Mediation"
recently developed by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), the American Bar Association
("ABA"), and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution ("SPIDR") defines self-determination
as "the fundamental principle of mediation." MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATION
Standard 1 (1994).
131. "SELF-DETERMINATION: is the principle which recognizes that parties to a dispute have the
ability and the right to define the issues, needs, and solutions and to determine the outcome of the
mediation process. It is the responsibility of the parties to mutually decide the terms of any agreement
reached in mediation." STANDARDS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE (1994).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/5

32

Kurtzberg and Henikoff: Kurtzberg: Freeing the Parties from the Law:

1997)

Landlord/TenantMediation

to effectively coerce or force the other into an agreement which they would not
otherwise accept.' Although the term "power imbalance" often conjures images in
most people's minds of one party physically or emotionally bullying the other into
an agreement, it is important to recognize that many types of "power imbalances"
come in much subtler forms. For example, situations in which (1) one party is more
articulate or intelligent than the other, (2) one party has a better sense of their legal
rights and entitlements than the other, or (3) one party is struggling with some type
of a language barrier and the other is not, can each create significant power
imbalances between the parties which potentially threaten self-determination.13 As
discussed earlier, the threat of power imbalance looms heavily in the background of
many mediations and must carefully be monitored in order to ensure that parties are
making decisions which they sincerely feel are in their own best interests. Finally,
underlying the principle of self-determination is the notion that mediation serves the
parties by enabling them to make autonomous decisions about their own fate.
The introduction of substantive law into a mediation can threaten the principle
of self-determination. 3 If the mediators discuss the law in a manner which leads
the parties to believe that certain issues are "non-negotiable" (i.e., the law clearly
dictates how certain issues should be resolved), then the parties' perceived power to
make their own decisions is diminished. This negative impact upon selfdetermination occurs regardless of whether the parties are interpreting the law
correctly or not. In situations where both parties are misunderstanding the relevant
law, the effect on the mediation process can be tragic as the parties would be
considering themselves "bound" by a false interpretation of the law.'
The principle of self-determination, however, may be equally threatened in
situations in which the parties are interpreting the relevant law correctly. One of the
significant advantages of mediation over traditional court processes is that it
encourages the parties to craft creative solutions to their problems which often may
not be legally imposed by a judge.'36 Unfortunately, parties frequently are not used

132. See Hughes, supra note 106, at 553 (providing an in-depth description of the potential
dangers which power imbalances present to mediation).
133. It is important to note that mediators do not see all power imbalances as a threat to selfdetermination or as even requiring "correction" of any kind. For example, the fact that a landlord owns
the building and a tenant must rent gives the landlord power over the tenant. Such 'imbalances' need
not be corrected. Other imbalances, however, such as the fact that one party knows the law and the other
does not are seen as 'correctable" imbalances which threaten the fairness of the process. It is the latter
type of power imbalances with which we are primarily concerned.
134. See Love, supra note 123, at 701.
135. Some mediators who defined their role as providing the parties with "legal information" and
not "legal advice" stated that even if they thought that both parties were jointly misinterpreting the law
which the mediators had provided, they would not correct the parties' conclusions. Many also noted that
in practice, it is extremely rare that such a "dual misinterpretation" occurs. Doran Interview, supra note
6. Shaw Interview, supra note 6.
136. For example, if noise were an important issue in a mediation between a landlord and a tenant,
there are a number of creative options which the individuals could develop to resolve their problem that
ajudge would not normally impose. The tenant might agree to reorganize her rooms so that the areas
in which the most noisy activity occurs - such as the family room - are not directly above the landlord's
bedroom. Alternatively, the two parties might agree to jointly purchase a carpet to install in the upper
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to making their own decisions and look to the mediator for "the answer" to their
problems. Once informed of "the law," many parties reflexively defer to it, thus
effectively losing the ability to make decisions fully based on their own perceptions
of a good outcome.
4. Informed Consent
The principle of "informed consent" is one of the standards of mediation which
is generally recognized by practitioners and commentators as important to the
mediation process. However, often these individuals have very different conceptions
of what the principle represents. The proposed ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR THE
PROVISION OF COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES, recently
developed in Massachusetts, states that "informed consent" requires that "[t]he
neutral shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that each party to the dispute
resolution process (a) understands the nature and character of the process, and (b)
in consensual processes, understands and voluntarily consents to any agreement
reached in the process."' 37 This definition of the standard focuses mainly on the
individual's understanding of the mediation process and its voluntary nature. In
contrast, the STANDARDS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE developed by the Massachusetts
Association of Mediation Programs defines "informed consent" as "the principle
which affirns the parties' rights to information about the mediation process, and,
when necessary,their legal rights, options, and relevant resources before consenting
to participate in mediation or consenting to the terms of any agreement reached in
mediation." '38 This definition appears to focus more on the parties' "informational
right" to be provided with relevant data -- whether procedural, factual, or legal -before being asked to make a decision. Although the proposed "Ethical Standards"
also includes such an "informational right" in their informed consent standard, it is
framed as both discretionary 39 and more procedural in nature. Specifically, the
Ethical Standards dictate that "[w]hen a party is unrepresented by counsel and where
the neutral believes that independent legal counsel and/or independent expert
information or advice is needed to reach an informed agreement or to protect the
rights of one or more of the participants, the neutral shall so inform the
participant(s)."'" Although this standard demands that mediators ensure that parties
are not making "uninformed" decisions, it does not authorize mediators to provide

apartment to absorb sound. In either case, it is highly unlikely that in cases such as this one, judges can
render decisions specifically tailored to the parties' needs.
137. ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF COURT-CONNECTED DIsPUTE RESOLUTION

SERVICES Standard Ill(B) (Proposed Draft 1995).
138. Principle Number Two -INFORMED CONSENT, STANDARDS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE,
supra note 118.
139. "A neutral may use his or her knowledge to inform the parties' deliberations, but shall not
provide legal advise, counseling, or other professional services in connection with the dispute resolution
process." ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SERVICES Standard III(B)(4) (Proposed Draft 1995).

at Standard III(B)(3).
140. Id.
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the missing information, but merely authorizes them to make sure that the parties are
aware that they might not be in possession of all of the necessary information. Thus,
the mediator's obligation is framed as procedural -- they are obligated to alert parties
to the various alternative sources of information available before proceeding with the
process of the mediation. In contrast, the MAMP standards appear to give the
mediators more flexibility to provide parties with missing substantive information.
This difference between the two standards is illustrative of the current debate
surrounding the concept of "informed consent." Many mediators practicing
"facilitative" mediation are hesitant to provide the parties with any substantive
information. Such mediators often consider their role to be that of a "guardian of the
process of the mediation;" they do not wish to become entangled in the substance of
the dispute. In cases where they feel that parties may be making decisions without
the benefit of important information (legal or otherwise), mediators often find
themselves in a bit of an ethical quandary. Attempts to raise one party's level of
knowledge regarding relevant information potentially threaten the neutrality of the
mediator in the eyes of the other disputant.
One interpretation of the principle of "informed consent" holds that such
mediators must at least ensure that parties thinking of agreeing to a proposal are
procedurallyinformed regarding their various alternatives -- they understand that it
is possible to return to court, seek a lawyer's advice, etc. and have thought through
the possible consequences of accepting the offer on the table. Facilitative mediators
typically use questions to encourage parties to consider their alternatives and to raise
their awareness of relevant information of which they might not be cognizant. Some
useful lines of questioning generally touch upon such issues as: (1) the possible
implications of the proposed agreement, (2) the party's knowledge of any relevant
law, (3) the party's conjectures as to potential court outcomes, and (4) whether it
to the party's decision making process if they knew that a
would make a difference
4
relevant law existed.' '
Other mediators, however, argue that such "procedural" knowledge alone is not
sufficient. In order to make "informed" decisions, parties must be provided with all
of the relevant information. As mentioned earlier, this argument is particularly
persuasive in the arena of landlord/tenant mediation as tenants typically are not
aware of the substantial body of Massachusetts law which is highly protective of
their rights. At the core of the summary process mediators' ethical and professional
dilemma is the tension between increasing parties' knowledge regarding the relevant
law while maintaining neutrality and self-determination.

V. PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS

141. One mediator interviewed during this study described "informed consent" as composed of two
elements: (1) full knowledge of the parties of their legal rights and alternatives, and (2) full
understanding of the parties of their interests and needs. Of the two elements, he felt that the latter was
much more important. Doran Interview, supra note 6.
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In examining both the role of the law in mediation and mediation's
effectiveness at addressing power imbalances in the landlord-tenant context, it is
necessary to look at a variety of approaches to incorporating the law into landlordtenant mediation. We have selected four separate programs as representative of the
spectrum of approaches available. The first program seeks to completely avoid
incorporation of the law into landlord-tenant mediation; the second incorporates the
law through the use of a "neutral manual," which parties may request to see but
mediators will not explain; the third program has mediators directly tell the parties
what the law says, but only if asked; and the fourth has mediators not only explain
the law, but encourages mediators to predict court outcomes if the case were to
proceed tfocus in this section will be on the second and third programs/approacrial.
Our primary es, since they are the primaryprograms/approaches, as they are the
primary approaches we are aware of that are presently used in summary process
mediation in the Massachusetts area. Our description and evaluation of these
programs will be based on our direct observations of their training sessions, direct
observations of mediation, direct observations of court sessions, interviews with
mediators, and a comparison of mediated outcomes at each court with
adjudicated/non-mediated outcomes.
Our description and evaluation of the first and fourth approaches, in contrast,
will be much more theoretical. The first approach has been used by both authors
while mediating non-summary process landlord-tenant cases in small claims court.
A variety of programs that mediate non-summary process landlord-tenant cases use
the first approach, but it is generally considered inappropriate for eviction cases.
Nevertheless, we offer an analysis of this approach partly because it is the approach
attacked by the critics and partly to explain why it is generally considered
inappropriate by mediators and critics alike in the summary process setting. The
fourth approach is used primarily in the context of divorce and commercial
mediation. Neither author has any first-hand experience with it, and we know of no
mediators who apply it in the summary process context. However, because it
represents an approach that most aggressively seeks to eradicate power imbalances
based on different levels of knowledge of the law, we examine and evaluate its
potential for successful application to the summary process area.
A. HarvardMediation Program
The Harvard Mediation Program ("HMP"), a student-run organization at
Harvard Law School, has been in existence for the past fifteen years. 42 Students and
community members who have completed a 32 hour basic training provided by the
program mediate small claims cases in six district courts in the greater Boston

142. Unless otherwise specified, all information in this section regarding the Harvard Mediation

Program was collected either through informal conversations with Gabrielle Gropman, who is the
Program Administrator, and various members of the Student Board, or through the authors' personal
experiences as the Training Director and President of the organization in 1995 - 1996.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/5
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area. 43 Mediators who have also completed a 16 hour advanced training are eligible
to participate in cases involving parent/child disputes, criminal cases and other more
complex situations.'" During the 1994 - 1995 school year, 88 mediators in the
program mediated 397 small claims cases and 28 advanced cases. 4 In both the
basic and the advanced program, HMP mediators employ an interest-based,
facilitative model of mediation to help the parties to settle their disputes. This
approach, which lies squarely within Quadrant Two of our graph, aims to increase
the level of understanding between the parties and empower them to find their own
solution to the conflict at hand.
HMP mediators encounter disputes involving landlord/tenant issues in small
claims court and occasionally in the advanced cases. Although the program does not
mediate summary process eviction cases, disputes mediated by HMP occasionally
do conclude with the tenant agreeing to vacate the apartment. Typically, however,
landlords initiating small claims proceedings are not looking to evict the tenant, but
rather to collect on rent past due. In many situations, once the case has been
scheduled for court, the tenant is no longer living in the landlord's apartment and
eviction is not an issue.
The interest-based, facilitative model of mediation which HMP utilizes
encourages mediators to be extremely purposeful or "hard" on the process of the
mediation, but "soft" on the substance; mediators are trained to minimize the impact
which their actions may have on the terms of the ultimate agreement. Therefore,
although mediators are encouraged to "reality test" parties to ensure that they have
thought through their various conclusions (e.g., ideas about their alternatives,
decisions to agree to an option on the table, etc.), mediators are told not to mold the
substance of the agreement by suggesting options, evaluating cases, or explaining
relevant law to the parties. If the mediator believes that one or both of the parties is
unaware of an important law or if the parties ask the mediators about the relevance
of legal principles, she is expected to do one of four things: (1) ignore the legal
issue--if the parties themselves do not raise the issue as one of their concerns or
interests; (2) suggest to the parties that they may wish to speak with attorneys; (3)
"reality test" the parties to determine their level of knowledge of the law and its
significance to them;' or (4) suggest to the parties that if they are mainly concerned
with their legal rights, their case might be better suited for adjudication. Under no

143. Specifically, HMP mediates small claims cases in Brookline, Cambridge, Chelsea, Malden,
Roxbury, and Quincy District Courts. See HARVARD MEDIATION PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT 1 - 2
(1994-1995).

144. The parent/child cases are CHINS cases referred to the program by the Malden District Court
and the criminal cases are referred by the Chelsea District Court. See id at 7.
145. See id. at4, 7.
146. "Reality testing" involves questioning the parties in order to get them to scrutinize their
positions, demands, assumptions, and alternatives. In this context, a mediator might want to ask
questions that would elicit from the party the fact that s/he was unaware of the applicable law. This
would allow the party to reflect on how important the law was to him or her and would probably serve
to remind him or her of the option to go back before the judge. Reality testing is often done in private
sessions to encourage honest reflection, avoid posturing and avoid exploring each party's potential
vulnerabilities in front of the other party.
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circumstances do mediators provide the parties with legal information or advice of
any kind. The HMP training manual does contain a section briefly outlining relevant
small claims law, however, trainees are told that the section is merely included to
familiarize them with relevant law and is absolutely not to be used as a reference
during mediation.
On a substantive level, skilled mediators using the HMP approach generally
succeed at focusing the parties on their interests and concerns, however often at the
expense of important legal rights. Many of the critics' arguments outlined in Section
One are directed specifically at this type of approach to mediation. Numerous
rationales lay behind HMP's program policy which prohibits mediators from
providing parties with "the law" during mediation. First, although individuals in the
program are provided with a brief summary of small claims law, there is no
guarantee that mediators will apply that law correctly to individual cases or even that
the clerk-magistrate will end up ruling as they predict. Second, despite the often
cited distinction between "legal information" and "legal advice," the program has
legitimate concerns that law students instructed to provide parties with legal
information may overstep their bounds. Lastly, and probably most importantly, it
is feared that allowing mediators to provide parties with relevant law may greatly
threaten mediator neutrality. Despite these rationalizations, there are significant
costs to the HMP approach. While the facilitative model employed by HMP
encourages parties to craft their own "fair" agreements, it fails to provide them with
any access to developed legal standards of fairness, even when the parties consider
such standards to be relevant.
The HMP mediation approach is highly focused on maintaining mediator
neutrality in the eyes of the parties. During the thirty-two hour basic mediation
training, trainees are instructed to be extremely sensitive to party perceptions and are
constantly encouraged to consider how their actions may be misinterpreted by
disputants. The decision to not have mediators introduce law into the dispute
resolution process is based in part upon the concern that such an introduction would
threaten mediator neutrality. First, mediators providing parties with legal
information would need to be exceedingly careful to ensure that their own thoughts
and opinions regarding both the case and the parties did not color their decisions
regarding which laws to introduce and when to do so. Additionally, even if the
mediators could be completely "objectively neutral" in their decisions regarding the
law, the risk still exists that parties may perceive the mediators as favoring one side
if the law relevant to the dispute happens to support one side's case more than the
others.
HMP's policy decision to not allow the mediators to substantively discuss the
law with the parties, therefore, appears to help the program to maintain a high level
of perceived and actual mediator neutrality. Although the policy generally does help
mediators to maintain their neutrality, in some circumstances the mediators' inability
to provide disputants with relevant legal information can actually threaten their
neutrality. Specifically, in those situations in which one party is considerably more
knowledgeable and informed than the other, HMP mediators' responses to direct
questions from parties regarding the law (e.g. "Its not really my role to tell you what
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/5
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the law is," or "Ifyou feel that the law is central to your dispute, you might want to
consider contacting an attorney.") favor the informed party. Although HMP's
policies appear neutral on their face, the program's refusal to provide parties with
any legal information effectively favors knowledgeable parties.
Because parties are often encouraged to make decisions without the benefit of
relevant legal information, the level of informed consent created by HMP's
mediation approach is extremely low. The program attempts to compensate for this
weakness by ensuring that parties have maintained some minimal level of
"procedural informed consent." Specifically, before allowing parties to commit to
an agreement, HMP mediators are charged with ensuring that the disputants
procedurallyunderstand the mediation process and understand the fact that there are
other options available to them. While the mediators will not inform the parties as
to what they believe would happen in court, they often ask the parties very direct
questions to ensure that the parties have at least considered what they believe to be
their true alternatives before settling on any one option. Lastly, HMP mediators are
instructed to procedurallyensure that parties understand the implications of any
proposed solution before agreeing to it. Thus, while HMP mediators may not
substantively tell parties what their alternatives are or the implications of any
proposed agreement, they are instructed to take proceduralsteps to at least ensure
that the parties have thought through these issues for themselves. Although these
procedural precautions may alleviate concerns regarding informed consent in some
contexts, in many cases they prove to be highly inadequate.
Lastly, the approach utilized by HMP is extremely concerned with the issue of
self-determination. The thirty-two hour basic mediation training required of all
small claims mediators focuses very heavily on ensuring that mediators utilize a
"facilitative" mediation approach in which they do not suggest options, evaluate
cases, or provide legal information. In the court-annexed setting in which HMP
mediators operate, it is feared that any information provided by the mediators will
heavily influence parties' actions, thus, reducing their ability to craft their own
agreement to their dispute. Although this approach generally ensures a relatively
high level of self-determination on the part of the parties, we question how valuable
the principle of self-determination really is when parties are being asked to make
decisions without having access to all of the information relevant to the dispute.
Although we have defined "self-determination" and "informed consent" as distinct
concepts, inreality they are related in that the value of self-determination is
dependent upon how informed the parties are when they render their decisions.
Therefore, although HMP's approach supports the principle of self-determination,
its inability to adequately educate the parties as to their legal rights and entitlements
drains the principle of much of its value.

B. Mediation Works, Inc.
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1. General Program Description 47
Mediation Works, Inc. ("MWI") is a non-profit corporation which provides
alternative dispute resolution training and mediation services throughout New
England. MWI's eviction mediation program provides housing mediation services
to communities on the South Shore of Boston. 4 " Started in September of 1994 with
help from MWI's parent organization, the South Shore Housing Development
Corporation ("South Shore Housing"), MWI has been mediating landlord-tenant
cases - both summary process (i.e., eviction) and non-summary process -- for almost
two years. Although MWI's parent organization is mainly concerned with keeping
people housed, MWI operates independently from South Shore Housing and has
managed to maintain its reputation as a neutral program.
MWI mediators work mainly in Plymouth and Norfolk counties helping to
resolve a variety of disputes ranging from small claims and business conflicts to
parent/child, divorce, and landlord/tenant summary process eviction cases. The
program has trained over 100 people to mediate and currently has a pool of about
twenty-five to thirty people who conduct "advanced" mediation on a case-by-case
basis (generally parent/child, divorce, corporate, small business and landlord/tenant
cases) and eight to ten "active" mediators who perform small claims and summary
process mediations weekly. Each year, MWI typically conducts approximately 100 125 summary process mediations, fifty to seventy-five small claims cases, and
approximately twenty-five advanced cases.
MWI's housing cases are broken down into two main categories: summary
process and non-summary process cases. Non-summary process cases generally
come from the small claims and "advanced" mediation pool and include all housing
disputes which havenot yet progressed to the stage of an eviction proceeding. These
typically involve disputes between tenants and landlords or multiple tenants over a
variety of issues which occasionally include nonpayment of rent. Summary process
cases, on the other hand, almost exclusively deal with nonpayment of rent. All of
the summary process mediation which the organization conducts take place on the
day of trial. Thus, cases which are mediated are already in the advanced stages of
the eviction process: the landlord has already terminated the tenancy by filing a
fourteen day notice-to-quit with the tenant; the landlord has filed a summons and

147. All of the information in this section describing Mediation Works, Inc. (MWI) was gathered
through informal conversations with the program's director, Chuck Doran (formal interviews were
conducted with him on February 12, 1996 and on March 4, 1996 in Cambridge, Massachusetts.) and
from observations of the program's Summary Process Mediation Training conducted on the 23rd, 25th,
and 27th of January, 1996 in Quincy, Massachusetts.
148. The South Shore community includes a number of small cities and towns south of Boston,
including Rockland, Quincy (pop. 84,985), Plymouth (pop. 45,608), and Hingham (pop. 19,821). See
1990 U.S. Census. MWI mediates cases in the Plymouth District Court and the Hingham District Court,
which are located in Plymouth County, and the Quincy District Court, which is located in Norfolk
County. In Massachusetts, District Courts have jurisdiction over small claims, summary process, civil,
criminal, and juvenile cases. MWI mediates predominantly small claims, summary process, parent/child,
divorce, and misdemeanor criminal cases.
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complaint with the tenant and the court; the tenant has been given an opportunity to
file an answer to the complaint and to serve the landlord with discovery; the landlord
has been given an opportunity to formally respond to the answer and/or discovery;
and the case is ready to be heard by a judge.
MWI requires specialized training for those mediators who elect to do summary
process cases. In addition to the thirty hour basic training in ufacilitativen mediation
skills taken by individuals participating in small claims mediation, mediators
conducting summary process mediation must generally have experience mediating
and have also participated in MWI's fifteen-hour summary process mediation
training, which provides both a background in Massachusetts' substantive and
procedural landlord-tenant law and further training in mediation skills and
techniques. At the fifteen-hour summary process mediation training, mediators are
given a resource manual which contains relevant Massachusetts statutes and
regulations, as well as a clearly worded summary of the Massachusetts rules and
regulations governing the eviction process. 49 Trainees are expected to both read the
manual and keep it for use as a reference tool during actual mediations.
In contrast, mediators helping parties to resolve landlord/ tenant disputes in
small claims court are not provided with a resource manual outlining relevant
Massachusetts law. In fact, they are specifically instructed not to introduce legal
issues into basic small claims mediation, even if asked to do so by the parties. As
this policy regarding the incorporation of law into small claims landlord/tenant
mediation is very similar to that followed by -MP, we will not analyze it any
further. Instead, we will focus the remainder of this section on the aspect of MWI
that distinguishes it from HMP: its incorporation of the law into its summary process
cases through the use of an "authoritative resource."
2. Program Goals: Summary Process Mediation
MWI employs a "facilitative" mediation approach"' which predominately
focuses on the interests and concerns of the parties. The goal of the process is to
have the mediators improve communication between the parties in order to increase
their understanding of each side's perspective of the dispute and empower the parties
to develop a solution which best meets their individual needs."' Despite the heavy
focus on interests, however, MWI's summary process procedures do enable parties

MEDIATION WORKS, INC., SUMMARY PROCESS RESOURCE MANUAL (1996).
150. In "facilitative" mediation, the mediator seeks to avoid directly influencing the substance of
agreements as much as possible, instead focusing on the fairness of the mediation process. Thus,

149. See

extremely facilitative mediators will avoid suggesting options to parties as much as possible. In contrast,
directive" mediation involves the mediator more directly in shaping the substance of the mediation. In
the context of incorporating the law into mediation, facilitative mediators will hesitate to raise legal
issues that the parties fail to raise themselves, even if the legal issues appear to be extremely relevant,
while more directive mediators will raise legal issues themselves whenever they seem important enough
to do so. MWI employs a facilitative approach to incorporating the law into mediation.
151. See Bush, supra note 103, at 267-73 (identifying mediation's unique powers as its ability to
promote both empowerment and mutual recognition).
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to learn more about their respective legal rights if they feel that such knowledge is
important to the resolution of their conflict.
Mediators are trained to incorporate the law into the mediation through the use
of an "authoritative resource." During their opening statement, mediators inform the
parties that they possess an "authoritative legal resource" which can be used if
anyone has any questions regarding landlord/tenant law. Although the mediators
specifically state that they cannot interpret any of the laws for the parties--as that
would be providing legal advice--they encourage the parties to ask to use the manual
if they have any questions. Mediators will not, however, introduce the law into the
mediation unless the parties ask them to do so--regardless of how relevant it may
seem to be. Nevertheless, access to the "neutral manual" is provided in the hope that
parties will be better equipped to negotiate with one another knowing both their
interests and rights.
Several rationales underlie MWI's summary process mediation approach. The
program policy of prohibiting mediators from interpreting the manual's statutes and
laws is based on three main concerns: (1) Mediators risk losing their neutrality by
interpreting a law in a manner which favors one party over the other, (2) Mediators
may incorrectly interpret the law as there is always some uncertainty as to how a
judge would rule, and (3) Legal interpretation exposes the program to potential
liability for unauthorized practice of law.' 2 The decision to use neutral, authoritative
resources was based upon a desire to provide parties with legal information while
still maintaining mediator neutrality and self-determination. This is evidenced by
the instructions given to trainees at MWI's January 23, 1996 summary process
mediation training to, ugo to the manual, even if you do know [the law]. You don't
want to set up a situation where it's your interpretation of the law against the party's
interpretation.""5 3 The goal of MWI's summary process mediation approach,
therefore, is to provide a process located in Quadrant Three of our theoretical graph:
one that enables parties to focus on both their interests and rights during the
mediation.
3. Program Evaluation: Comparison to Mediation Ideals
MWI's approach provides parties with the opportunity to explore the law,
however, only at their own initiative. While the process enables parties to effectively
explore and prioritize their interests, the "neutral manual" present in the mediation
room is rarely used."s4 Given the existing power imbalances between landlords and
tenants, it is not surprising that uninformed tenants rarely avail themselves of this
opportunity to inform themselves. Several characteristics of the MWI mediation

152. Doran Interview, supra note 6.
153. Chuck Doran, Instructions at the MWI Summary Process Mediation Training (January 23,

1996).
154. At MWI's January 23, 1996 summary process mediation training, trainees were repeatedly

assured that, "the need to use [the authoritative] resource does not arise very often.'
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approach render the manual ineffective in informing parties of their legal
entitlements.
First, the program's facilitative approach to introducing the law.55 places the
burden of raising legal issues on the parties who are frequently so ignorant of their
rights that they are not even able to identify the legal issues that are important to
them. Thus, if the parties are discussing an issue which is directly addressed by a
relevant Massachusetts law, the mediators will only refer to the manual if the parties
express confusion over a legal issue or if it is evident that legal clarification is
necessary. While in some cases this program policy may serve to inform ignorant
parties, in other situations in which the parties do not even realize that a legal rule
exists, the mediators may not be adequately "prompted" to refer to the manual and
may decide to remain silent."5 6 Given that tenants are much more likely than
landlords to not raise the appropriate legal questions and vocalize "confusion" over
MWI's "neutral manual approach" often fails to provide an
relevant laws,'
adequate mechanism for getting legal information to the party that needs it most.
Second, MWI's approach often places the burden of understanding complex statutes
and regulations completely on the parties who are frequently incapable of
deciphering such legalese without the benefit of counsel. When parties do ask for
information regarding the law, MWI mediators first refer parties to the "summary"
section of the authoritative resource which describes Massachusetts law in layman's
terms. If questions still exist, the mediators may choose to refer the parties to the
actual statutes and regulations themselves which are also included in the manual if
there are questions regarding either the summaries or the statutes, however, the
mediators are specifically trained not to offer any explanation or interpretation of the
material contained in the manual. Thus, a tenant who has been (erroneously) told
by a friend that his "right to quiet enjoyment" has been violated by the landlord
because his electricity was cut off for several hours might be asked to make sense of
the first sentence of the relevant statute, which reads as follows:

155. See supra note 151.
156. For example, in a summary process case observed in Quincy court, the parties spent time
discussing the issue of the security deposit and how much of it would be applied to future rent. Despite
the fact that numerous Massachusetts laws exist regulating the return of security deposits (and outlining
situations in which the landlord may be liable for paying the tenant three times the initial deposit), the
mediator never referred the parties to the resource manual. Observation of summary process eviction
mediation in Quincy District Court, March 28, 1996.
157. MWI Director, Chuck Doran, hypothesizes that tenants' awareness of their rights is "very, very
low" and estimates that the ratio of informed tenants to informed landlords parallels the ratio of tenants
who have attorneys to landlords who have attorneys. See Doran Interview, supra note 6. In the three
courts that MWI mediates at-Quincy, Plymouth, and Hingham-only 7.8% of tenants had attorneys in
1995 (117 out of 1502), while 60.4% of landlords did (907 out of 1502). We would suggest that a more
accurate proxy for "informed parties" includes both parties who are represented by counsel and parties
who are repeat players. When that figure is considered, the balance of power tips even more drastically
in favor of landlords: 7.8% of tenants are informed of their rights (117 out of 1502) and 80.2% of
landlords are informed (1205 out of 1502). Either way, by putting the burden of asking to see the
manual on the parties, MWI's 'neutral manual approach" gives informed landlords a decided advantage
over uninformed tenants.
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Any lessor or landlord of any building or part thereof occupied for
dwelling purposes, other than a room or rooms in a hotel, but including
a mobile home or land therefore, who is required by law or by the express
or implied terms of any contract or lease or tenancy at will to furnish
water, hot water, heat, light, power, gas, elevator service, telephone
service, janitor service or refrigeration service to any occupant of such
building or part thereof, who willfully or intentionally fails to furnish such
water, hot water, heat, light, power, gas, elevator service, telephone
service, janitor service or refrigeration service at any time when the same
is necessary to the proper or customary use of such building or are
thereof, or any lessor or landlord who directly or indirectly interferes with
the furnishing by another of such utilities or services, or who transfers the
responsibility for payment for any utility services to the occupant without
his knowledge or consent, or any lessor or landlord who directly or
indirectly interferes with the quiet enjoyment of any residential premises
by the occupant, or who attempts to regain possession of such premises
by force without benefit ofjudicial process, shall be punished by a fine of
not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than three hundred dollars, or
by imprisonment for not more than six months."'8
The odds of the average layperson understanding the above statute are slim, at
best. Given the incredible density of the written statutes, it is not surprising that one
tenants' advocate considered the "authoritative resource" approach to incorporating
law into housing mediation to be "totally worthless" to tenants because "The
Massachusetts Legislature is incredibly bad.., at drafting legislation that is...
generally understandable .... I've had lawyers come to me and say, 'What does this
statute mean?' [The authoritative resource approach] would be of no value
whatsoever to tenants, who are generally less well read than the people at-large, are
5 9
frequently illiterate, and sometimes do not speak very good English.""
Although
the summaries provided in MWI's resource manual do help to explain the law to
parties in simpler terms, they do not always provide a clear cut answer, making it
necessary to refer to the more complex statutes and regulations themselves.
Lastly, although Massachusetts law is very protective of tenant's rights, the
timing of MWI's mediation works to the detriment of tenants. Although mediators
often encourage parties to mediate prior to the date of their hearing, almost all
landlords refuse to do so."' ° Therefore, although the manual provides the tenants
with a resource to help them understand the law, at the time of the mediation, when
they are given the opportunity to use the manual, most tenants have already forfeited
their rights by failing to file an answer to the complaint which lists out all of their

158. MAss GEN. L. ch. 186 § 14 (1995). The sentence represents only the first sentence of the
statute. This example was actually taken from a role play used at the MWI summary process mediation
training on January 23, 1996.
159. Bertling Interview, supra note 6.
160. Doran Interview, supra note 6.
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defenses. 6 ' Therefore, it is difficult for the approach used by MWI to focus on both
parties' interests and rights, since the majority of the tenants involved in such
mediations have already lost their right to rely on the bulk of available protections
substantive rights by the time of the mediation. Although the MWI program aspires
to be located within the domain of Quadrant Three, the difficulties described above
typically limit its ability to effectively inform the parties of their rights and reduce
existing power imbalances caused by different levels of knowledge and familiarity
with the law and the legal system.
MWI's mediation approach in summary process cases can be further evaluated
using several of the procedural criteria outlined in the previous section. In sum, the
program puts a high emphasis on neutrality and self-determination, and a lower
emphasis on the principle of informed consent. In our view, the context of landlordtenant mediation requires special attention to the principle of informed consent, and
MWI's failure to provide such attention is its biggest shortcoming.
MWI's approach maintains the neutrality of its mediators; however, use of the
manual may still occasionally threaten this core mediation principle. For example,
if one party believes that the mediator is only referring to the resource manual to
point out law which favors her opponent, use of the book threatens to undermine the
mediator's neutrality. More basically, all of the strategic decisions regarding when
and how to refer to the manual may be perceived by one side as favoring the other's
arguments or interests.6 Mediators using the manual, therefore, must be extremely
sensitive to how their actions impact the parties' perceptions of their neutrality.
Finally, the facilitative mediation approach employed by MWI is very "partycentered" in that the disputants are asked to focus much of their time exploring each
side's interests and concerns, improving communication and brainstorming possible
solutions. The parties play an extremely active role in the mediation and are
expected to decide for themselves how to resolve their conflict. Although this
process places a rather large emphasis on the principle of self-determination, again
we question how empowering it is to make one's own decisions when one is
extremely uninformed." 3
4. Program Evaluation: Comparison to Real-Life Alternatives
A comparison of MWI's mediated summary process cases to summary process
cases that were either litigated or settled without mediation in the same courts reveals
that while MWI's results do show outcomes that tend to reflect the "pro-landlord"
power differentials discussed above, they also show that mediation, as practiced by

161. In the three courts that MWI mediates in--Quincy, Plymouth, and Hingham District Courtstenants filed answers only 27.8% of the time (417 out of 1502 cases). Moreover, tenants filed informed
answers-i.e., those which raised potentially legitimate defenses and counterclaims-only 14.6% of the
time (219 out of 1502 cases).
162. Cf.Honeyman, supra note 23, at 141 (noting that mediators can sometimes indirectly
demonstrate bias by emphasizing certain subjects and deemphasizing others).
163. See supra page 40.
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MWI, is a better option for tenants than the alternatives of adjudication and
negotiated settlement.'"
For example, in adjudicated cases, landlords were granted possession of the
premises 100% of the time 6" and tenants defaulted 92.4% of the time; while tenants
raised counterclaims approximately 14.5% of the time, judgment was entered for the
landlord on the counterclaims every time.'" In no cases was there any rent
abatement due to the conditions of the apartment or an order for the landlord to do
repairs.
A similar pattern emerges in cases that settled through non-mediated/negotiated
settlements. All of the non-mediated agreements granted possession to the
landlord;' 67 none granted rent abatements due to housing code violations; and only
a handful set up payment plans designed to give tenants an opportunity to keep
possession."' Most agreements required the tenant to vacate and pay the full back
rent immediately or within a few weeks. A large majority of the non-mediated
agreements were form agreements drafted by the landlord's attorney. Few contained
69
any clauses that might even conceivably be considered favorable to the tenant.
In contrast, mediated agreements at least offered tenants the possibility of
retaining possession. While all of the ninety-three mediated cases that led to a
settlement 7 resulted in agreements that granted possession to the landlord, 10.8%

164. Our observations are based on a comparison between 103 summary proces s cases mediated
by MWI in 1995 at Plymouth and Hingham District Courts (ofwhich 93 settled) and 159 adjudicated
cases (including trials and defaults) and 74 negotiated (i.e., non-mediated) cases at those same courts.
An additional 103 summary process cases from Plymouth and Hingham Courts were not considered: 31
of those cases were transferred to Housing Court while the remaining 72 were voluntarily dismissed by
the landlord before judgment could be entered. In these cases, it was impossible to determine who
effectively received possession. It was clear, however, that none of the dismissals were clear tenant
victories, such as a granted motion to dismiss. Cases from Quincy District Court were not considered.
While MWI presently mediates cases in Quincy, they began mediating there in 1996, after the period
we examined.
165. Landlords were granted possession in 13 out of 13 cases that went to trial. In the remaining
146 cases, landlords were granted possession by default judgment.
166. Tenants raised counterclaims in approximately 14.5% of the total cases at these three courts.
While breakdowns for adjudicated cases were not calculated, there is no reason to believe that the
percentage of total cases in which counterclaims were filed would be different than the percentage of
adjudicated cases in which counterclaims were filed. In any event, it is clear that no tenants were
awarded any damages for any of their counterclaims.
167. All 74 of the non-mediated agreements granted possession to the landlord.
168. While exact figures are unavailable, a significant number of agreements contained payment
plans, but only a handful of agreements (less than five) contained payment plans that were designed to
allow the tenant to keep possession if the terms of the agreement were fulfilled.
169. Exact figures are unavailable to support these propositions. However, the agreements were
overwhelmingly pro-landlord. Most were drafted by landlord's attorneys, and almost all of them simply
had the tenant agreeing to vacate, pay all back rent, waive any rights to appeal, and waive any future
counterclaims. None contained any provisions for landlords to make repairs or for rent abatements due
to conditions problems. Because the agreements were so one-sided, we feel comfortable making the
generalizations made in the text.
170. MWI's settlement rate in summary process mediation is 91.2% (93 out of 102 mediation led
to a written agreement.) We examined the agreements produced in the 93 settled cases. The remaining
9 cases were considered to be either adjudicated or negotiated, depending on how they were ultimately
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of the agreements specified that possession would transfer to the tenant if certain
conditions were fulfilled.' 7 ' Furthermore, 10.8% of the agreements provided that the
landlord would reduce or waive some of the back rent owed due to problems with
conditions, and 10.8% of the agreements provided that the landlord would forgive
or reduce back rent in exchange for the tenant vacating by a certain date. Finally,
some of the agreements contained creative benefits for tenants. For example, one
landlord agreed to let the tenant store her furniture and boxes in a locked attic room.
Another landlord agreed to speak to the other tenants in the building and request that
they keep noise levels to a minimum when the defendant/tenant was in the building.
One agreement even contained a provision stating that the tenant could avoid
eviction by entering an alcohol rehabilitation program. Lastly, three landlords
agreed to provide the tenant with a positive reference for any future rentals. 72 None
of the above benefits for tenants were, in practice, found in any of the adjudicated
or negotiated outcomes.
Mediation also appeared to reduce the likelihood of having an execution issue
against the tenant. While landlords obtained executions in 75% of adjudicated cases
and 79.8% of non-mediated/negotiated cases, respectively, executions were obtained
(and not even necessarily served) in mediated cases only 52.7% of the time." Since
mediated cases, unlike adjudicated and non-mediated/negotiated cases, allow for the
possibility of possession reverting to the tenant, it is likely that a good number of the
mediated cases in which execution did not issue represent cases in which evictions
were avoided. This suggests that mediated cases are less likely to lead to evictions
than the alternatives.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that MWI's approach does not
adequately inform tenants of their rights. A comparison of mediated cases to those
in which tenants used a "pro se packet" is telling. Tenants who had the pro se packet
The
took almost twice as long to evict as tenants who went through mediation.'

resolved.
171. Ten of the 93 agreements had such provisions. In 7 out of the 10 cases, possession was to
transfer to the tenant when the terms of a payment plan were fulfilled. The other 3 agreements were
more creative and one agreement even made possession contingent upon the tenant entering an alcohol
treatment program.
172. See MWI 1995 SUMMARY PRocEss AGREEMENTS (on file with Chuck Doran).
173. Landlords obtained executions in 129 out of 172 adjudicated cases: seven out of thirteen cases
(53.8%) that were decided after a trial and 122 out of 159 cases (76.7%) that were decided by default.
In non-mediated/negotiated cases, executions were issued in fifty-nine out of seventy-four cases. In
mediated cases, executions were issued in only forty-nine out of ninety-three settled cases (52.7%). It
is difficult to determine the significance of the execution not issuing. Landlords need an execution to
forcefully remove a tenant from an apartment, however, many tenants might vacate the premises as soon
as ajudgment for possession is entered for the landlord, making it unnecessary for the landlord to get
the court to issue an execution. In such cases, an eviction takes place and the execution does not issue
simply because the threat of it issuing is enough to eject the tenant from the apartment. In other cases,
however, the execution might not issue because the tenant has paid the back rent owed, thus avoiding
eviction altogether.
174. In mediated cases where an execution was issued, it took an average of 47.0 days from the time
the complaint was filed until the time the execution was served (based on a sample of forty-nine cases).
In cases where tenants used aprose packet, it took an average of 77.6 days (based on a sample of seven
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same was true of cases in which tenants had attorneys. 175 Moreover, tenants who had
attorneys prevented execution from issuing in 62.7% of the cases. 76 Tenants who
had attorneys were much more likely to raise issues regarding conditions than tenants
in mediation. All tenants who had attorneys complained of problems with
conditions, while a majority of tenants in mediation did not. As a result, landlords
agreed to make repairs in only 2.2% of the mediated cases.
Finally, most of the mediated agreements were significantly "pro-landlord."
While a few of the agreements had creative clauses, as mentioned above, the
overwhelming majority of them contained boilerplate language which tended to
focus on when and how the tenant would vacate the apartment. For example, the
three most popular clauses in MWI mediated agreements were: (1) "The
defendant/tenant agrees to vacate by X date" (present in 64.5% of agreements); (2)
"The plaintiff/landlord agrees to hold and not serve the execution until after X date"
(present in 60.2% of agreements); (3) "Failure of the defendant/tenant to vacate by
X date will allow the plaintifflandlord to serve the execution immediately" (present
in 47.3% of agreements). The first and third of these clauses are clearly very "prolandlord"; the second appears to be a possible benefit to the tenant, but in reality, the
landlord typically does not agree to hold the execution for very long 78 and is
automatically able to issue an execution if the tenant breaches the agreement.
Unfortunately, tenants breach quite frequently, resulting in immediate issuance of
the execution. MWI agreements resulted in breach (and immediate issuance of an
execution against the tenant) 41.5% of the time.'7 9
5. Conclusion
At one point during MWI's most recent summary process mediation training,
one of the trainees expressed concerns about the program's ability to adequately

cases). It is fair to assume that tenants who use the pro se packet are relatively informed and that any
difference between the two samples is attributable to the differences in knowledge of the law.
175. On average, in mediated cases, it took 47.0 days from the day the complaint was filed until the
day the execution was served (based on a sample of forty-nine cases). In cases in which tenants had
attorneys it took 70.4 days (based on a sample of nineteen cases). The average for all cases was 45.2
days (based on a sample of 221 cases).
176. This data strongly corroborates our hypothesis that the reason tenants fare so poorly in court
is not because there are no problems with housing conditions but rather that they simply do not know
how to effectively assert their rights. However, it is possible that the data merely reflects the fact that
tenants' attorneys only take on the most egregious of cases. If tenants knew how to effectively assert
their rights, then they would get evicted much less often. Out of fifty-one cases in which tenants had

attorneys, execution did not issue in thirty-two of them. Of these cases, six were transferred to Housing
Court, seven were dismissed (one by motion, six by agreement), and nineteen simply did not issue
execution.
178. See supra note 195 (suggesting that execution is issued on an average of forty-seven days after
the complaint is filed in mediated cases). The average for both adjudicated and negotiated non-mediated
cases was 44.7 days. There is no statistically significant difference between the two figures.
179. In response to the research conducted by the authors, MWI has altered some of its prior
practices, such as the inclusion of prolandlord boilerplate language in agreement forms. Interview with
Chuck Doran (May 19, 1997).
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address the "information power imbalance" between landlords and tenants by using
the "neutral resource manual": "I'm not entirely comfortable becoming a tacit vehicle
for the powerful .... I would hate to become part of a system that contributed to the
problem, instead of being part of the solution." Other trainees immediately nodded
in assent.
The trainers' response was that mediation was not part of the problem,
especially when one considers that tenants probably do worse in court. "Essentially,
the tenants who come to us are already in a terrible situation. We make it slightly
better for them by offering them a chance to keep possession and work out some
kind of payment plan that is to their benefit."
MWI's approach does produce outcomes for tenants that are better than those
produced by the real-life alternatives of adjudication and non-mediated settlement.
However, there is good reason to believe that tenants are not adequately informed
of their rights in any of the real-world alternatives, including mediation as practiced
by MWI.
C. Hampshire Community Action CommissionHousing Program
1. General Program Description'
The Hampshire Community Action Commission's (HCAC's) Housing Program
is a grassroots anti-poverty program, designed to fight homelessness in the
Northampton community. The Housing Program consists of two separate
components: (1) a Housing Services Program, which provides free counseling to
tenants facing eviction proceedings, free information to both landlords and tenants
regarding the laws surrounding the eviction process, and free mediation services to
all interested parties involved in summary process/eviction cases and (2) a Housing
Search Program, which helps tenants who are "at-risk" of homelessness find housing.
Started in 1987 with funds from the Massachusetts Bar Foundation, Inc., HCAC's
mediation program focuses exclusively on housing cases and primarily on summary
process (i.e., eviction) cases.'' The program's approximately twenty mediators"'

180. The information in this section describing the Hampshire Community Action Commission
(HCAC) Housing Program was gathered through informal conversations with the program's Mediation
Coordinator, Gordon P. Shaw, and telephonic interviews conducted with him on March 11, 1996 and
April 15, 1996.
181. From September 1, 1994 through August 31, 1995, HCAC's Housing Services Program
mediated ninety-three cases, of which eighty-two were summary process cases. The remaining eleven
cases included four mediations where the disputants were all tenants and landlords at various stages of
terminating the tenancies of one or more of these tenants and were looking to mediation as an alternative
to summary process. See Memo, HampshireCommunity Action Commission HousingServices Program
Project Outcomes: September 1, 1994 - August 31, 1995 (1995) (excerpted from Annual Report to
Massachusetts Bar Foundation, Inc.) (on file with authors).
182. The program has had approximately twenty mediators over the course of the past year, six of
which have been active. The program typically sends four mediators each week to Northampton District
Court.
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perform almost all of its mediations at the Northampton District Court, which serves
the communities of Northampton, Amherst, and Easthampton. I3
While HCAC's counseling program for tenants and its mediation program are
technically distinct entities, "the vast majority of cases reach mediation after first
having been screened through the [tenant] counseling program."'T This is because
the mediation program has an arrangement with the clerk's office at the
Northampton District Court which allows them to advertise both the mediation and
counseling services to tenants as soon as they are served with a summons and
complaint.' 85 Under the program's regular procedure, however, landlords receive
a separate letter, informing them only of the mediation services and its potential
benefits to them. The letters are reprinted below to illustrate the significant
differences between them:

The Tenant's Letter:
FACING EVICTION?
CALL

FOR ASSISTANCE BEFORE YOUR COURT DATE

Dear Tenant:
This letter is to inform you of services for tenants available through the
Housing Services Program at Hampshire Community Action Commission. We are
writing to you because your name has appeared on the list of eviction cases at the
Northampton District Court for
It is our experience that many tenants go to their hearing without knowing their
legal rights or the procedure involved in an eviction. We invite you to contact our
program if you have any questions relating to your eviction. Our tenant counselor,
, can advise you about possible defenses and/or counterclaims to
your eviction, and assist you in preparing an "Answer," An "Answer must be filed

183. Northampton (pop. 29,289), Amherst (pop. 35,228), and Easthampton (pop. 15,537) are all
located inHampshire County. While Hampshire County is well known for some of its rustic, affluent

neighborhoods, its reputation is deceiving. The county has significant pockets of rural poor and has the
highest rate of people living at the poverty level inall of Massachusetts (The poverty rate is 10.8%;
while the Massachusetts average is 8.9%). InNorthampton, for example, 57.3% ofthe population lives
ina household eaming under $25,000/yr. In Easthampton, the comparable figure is 55.0%; in Amherst,
47.3%. See 1990 U.S. Census, supra note 83. Almost all of the tenants who get evicted are poor. See
Shaw Interview, supra note 6.
184. Id. Shaw, estimates that at least 50 - 55% of the tenants who mediate with the program are
informed about their rights through the program's tenant counseling service. Shaw Interview, supra note

6.
185. Under the arrangement, the court clerk sends the program the names of all parties to summary
process actions immediately after the 'entry date." The "entry date" is the date the landlord files the
summons and complaint in court. This must be done on a Monday at least seven, but no more than thirty

days after the landlord serves the summons and complaint to the tenant. Hence, tenants get the relevant
information ten to twelve days prior to the hearing date and prior to the time their answer is due.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/5
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with the court and served on your landlord no later than the Monday before your
hearing. If you do not file an Answer, the judge will not consider any of your
defenses or counterclaims--no matter how serious the violation.
Low-income tenants facing eviction For non-payment of rent may be eligible
for emergency rental assistance through the Welfare Department. Several area
churches and other organizations sometimes have charitable funds to help tenants
pay back rent and high utility bills. The tenant counselor can help you explore these
possible sources for getting assistance, as well as help negotiate a rental arrears
payment plan--if feasible under your income-with your landlord. Our counselor can
also help tenants who decide they need to move by providing information about area
housing options.
Housing Services also sponsors a free mediation clinic at the courthouse on the
day of eviction hearings. Mediation is a process where the tenant and landlord sit
down together in a private conference room and, with the aid of neutral person [sic],
attempt to work out mutually agreeable solution to their dispute. During the
mediation session, both parties are given a complete opportunity to speak and
present their concerns. The mediator does not judge the parties or give legal advice;
his or her role is to help the parties negotiate a fair settlement. Mediation can be
used as a means to resolve an eviction without having to go before a judge. If an
agreement is not reached through mediation, however, neither party forfeited their
right to have their case heard before a judge, and a hearing can be obtained the same
day. Mediation is a voluntary process and both the landlord and the tenant must be
willing to participate. If you are interested in trying to have your case mediated, you
should contact our mediation coordinator, Gordon Shaw. With prior notice of your
interest, he can contact the landlord and determine his or her willingness to
participate prior to your hearing date.
To speak with either the tenant counselor or the mediation coordinator, please
call the Housing Services Program between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.,
Monday through Friday at

Sincerely,
The Housing Services Program
The Landlord'sLetter

Dear Landlord:
This letter is to inform you of free mediation services available for landlords
and tenants concerning eviction disputes. We are writing to you because your name
has appeared on the list of summary process cases at the Northampton District Court
for

In a mediation session, a landlord and a tenant sit down together and, with the
aid of a neutral third party, attempt to work out a mutually agreeable solution to their
dispute. One of the advantages of mediation is that it allows the parties involved to
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51

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1997, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5
[Vol. 1997, No. I
JOURNAL OF DISPUTERESOLUTION
decide for themselves how the dispute should be resolved. If the case has been
brought because a tenant has fallen behind on the rent, the mediator can assist the
parties in working out a payment plan that could enable the landlord to recover all
past rent owed, and allow the tenant to continue to live in the rental unit if they can
keep current with their rent. If the tenant has brought counterclaims for code
violations, the mediator can help the parties put together a schedule for making
repairs, and then come to terms on a fair rental abatement figure. Sometimes a
tenant has no defense to an eviction, but needs more time to find another place to
live. Through mediation, the parties can come to terms on a move-out date, allaying
the landlord's fear of having the eviction delayed unilaterally by the tenant through
an appeal or a motion to stay the eviction.
Hampshire Community Action Commission has been sponsoring a landlordtenant mediation program at the Northampton District Court since 1987. If you are
interested in trying mediation, you can contact the Commission Monday through
. Mediations can be set up to take
Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., at
place in court at the time of the scheduled hearing date or out-of-court in advance of
the hearing date.
Mediation is a risk free, costless and private way to resolve a legal dispute; it
is a process the court strongly encourages landlords and tenants to undertake before
bringing their claims before a judge. If the settlement is not reached or an agreement
not honored by a party, you still have every right to take the matter before a judge.
Sincerely,
Gordon P. Shaw, Esq.
Mediation Coordinator
While all tenants receive letters, many landlords who have been through the
process several times do not. Neither landlords nor tenants are generally made aware
of the fact that different letters are sent to each party. In spite of these differences,
the program appears to have maintained its neutrality in the eyes of the parties. This
is because the mediation program is clearly separated from the counseling program
and the mediators stress that their neutrality is central to their role. According to Mr.
Shaw, the program's mediation coordinator, the parties are aware that the mediators'
goal is to fimd a "win-win" situation when possible and "to try to achieve solutions
that are beneficial to both parties.""8 6
The program aims to mediate cases as early as possible. While some landlords
will agree to mediate in advance of the hearing date--usually those who have
considerable counterclaims filed against them-- most landlords refuse to mediate
until the date of the hearing.
Program mediators must have significant prior mediation experience and
training before they can mediate summary process cases. Mediators must also
undergo a three hour summary process training in which they are taught an overview

186. Shaw Interview, supra note 6.
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of Massachusetts housing law and observe a mock summary process mediation .

7

While trainees are given materials summarizing Massachusetts housing law to study
on their own time, they are instructed not to bring the materials with them to the

mediation as an "authoritative resource." Rather, inexperienced mediators are paired
up with experienced mediators who know the law well enough to explain it to the
parties. ss
If issues come up surrounding the state of the law, experienced mediators will
not hesitate to explain to the parties the procedural rules surrounding eviction
proceedings. For example, mediators will routinely explain to parties things such as
the court's time line surrounding evictions, the process for obtaining an execution,
how damages work, and any other "procedural information" they might not know.
Mediators often introduce procedural legal information when they think it would be
relevant to the parties even if the disputants do not ask for it explicitly.8 9
In contrast, mediators will not offer substantive legal information unless the
parties specifically ask for it. Thus, mediators will never raise substantive issues that
are not raised by the parties. For example, a mediator would not ask a tenant in a
private session about the condition of the premises if the tenant had not already
independently raised the issue without any prodding. Such a maneuver would be
considered too much of a threat to the mediator's neutrality. " However, if a tenant
were to ask what the law was with regard to security deposits, a mediator would
provide the tenant with the relevant legal information. In no cases will the mediators
interpret the substantive law or give legal advice.

187. The program currently has plans to offer a fifteen hour training modeled in large part after the
one done by MWI. Id
188. It is noteworthy that only two of the experienced mediators are lawyers, which opens the
program up to accusations of unauthorized practice of law. According to the program's Mediation
Coordinator, the experienced non-lawyer mediators know the law as well as any of the lawyers do. See
Shaw Interview, supra note 6. Other attorney-mediators attest to similar experiences working with nonlawyer mediators. See Friedman Interview, supra note 102. Such evidence suggests that the ethical
rules should perhaps be modified/clarified to allow such experienced mediators to give legal information
without concerns that they will be brought up on charges.
189. Mediators tend to avoid introducing such information unless they are asked to do so by the
parties. See Shaw Interview, supra note 6. They will only introduce such information independently
of a request to do so by the parties if it is very apparent that the parties do not understand something that
is very important.
190. The rationale for the "facilitative" approach with regard to the introduction of substantive law
is grounded in neutrality. Raising substantive issues that the parties have failed to raise themselves is
considered too much of an advocate's role. See Shaw Interview, supra note 6. However, it is not
entirely clear why the program considers a more "directive" approach with regard to the introduction of
procedural law to be any less of a threat to neutrality than a 'directive" approach with regard to
substantive law. According to Shaw, "that's just where [we] draw the line." Id.
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2. Program Goals
HCAC clearly seeks to provide a process which would be in Quadrant Three
of our theoretical graph: one which enables parties to consider both their interests
and their rights during the mediation. As is the case with most programs aiming for

Quadrant Three, the goals of empowerment/self-determination and mutual
understanding are paramount. The main focus of the mediation is the parties'

subjective conceptions of fairness. uThe law" is neither determinative nor irrelevant;
rather, it is relevant insofar as it is a reference point used by the parties to determine

their own conception of what is fair. In the words of the program's coordinator,
"Our focus is not just on [the law and] legal posturing, but rather on the needs of the
parties and what their abilities are too .... Law is just one benchmark we use to
decide what is fair." (Emphasis Added) 9'
3. Program Evaluation: Comparison to Mediation Ideals
Like MWI, HCAC employs a predominantly facilitative approach to
introducing substantive law which places the burden of raising legal issues on the
uninformed parties. However, HCAC does two things which MWI does not that
partially rectify this problem. First, the HCAC approach allows mediators to be
more directive with regard to procedural law by explaining relevant summary
process time tables and jargon when it seems relevant for the parties to accomplish
their goals. Second, and more importantly, HCAC lets all tenants know about
opportunities to inform themselves of their legal rights prior to the mediation
through the use of their free counseling service. The combination of these policies
enables HCAC to more solidly locate its program in Quadrant Three of our graph.
Of course, HCAC mediators insure increased levels of informed consent at the
expense of their neutrality. By sending tenants letters describing both the counseling
and mediation services available to them, HCAC comes dangerously close to
blurring the line between the counseling and mediation programs. This threatens the
mediation program's neutrality. If landlords knew that the mediation program "was
connected to the tenant's counseling program," that the program writes reports to
justify its funding by citing statistics about how many evictions were avoided, or
even that the mediation program sends out different letters to landlords and tenants
offering entirely different services to each; the landlords might not trust the program
to be completely neutral."g It is important to keep the advocacy/counseling part of
the program completely separate from the neutral/mediation part of the program.
Unlike MWI's "authoritative resource approach," HCAC's approach puts the
burden of understanding complex statutes and regulations on experienced mediators,
as opposed to putting the burden on lay parties. Thus, experienced mediators are
able to paraphrase dense legal jargon, making it simpler for the parties to understand

191. Id

192. It is important to note that some landlords are aware of these things and still see the program
as neutral.
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ifthey ask. While this practice effectively raises the level of informed consent of the
parties, it potentially threatens mediator neutrality more than the use of an
authoritative resource does.
A larger number of tenants who mediate through HCAC appear to be informed
of their rights than at other programs due to the efforts of the counseling program.
However, the 45-50% of tenants who do not make use of the counseling services
appear to be just as vulnerable to unfair outcomes as uninformed tenants at other
programs. In short, HCAC's approach to incorporating the law during the
mediation, like MWI's, does little to help inform tenants of their rights. Rather, it
only benefits tenants who are already informed. The evidence suggests that
uninformed tenants simply do not raise legal concerns in mediations. As one HCAC
mediator observed, "Parties rarely fight over the law. The parties know the law if
they're raising it as an issue and it's not an issue if they don't raise it."' 93
4. Program Evaluation: Comparison to Real-Life Alternatives
A comparison of HCAC's 1995 mediated summary process cases to summary
process cases that were either litigated or settled without mediation in Northampton
District Court reveals that tenants do considerably better in mediation than they do
with either of the other two alternatives. Even if some dangers do exist for
uninformed tenants when mediating with HCAC, it appears that tenants as a whole
are better off mediating than they are either negotiating without a third-party neutral
or going before a judge."94
As was the case in the Plymouth and Hingham District Courts, tenants litigating
summary process cases at Northampton District Court faced a harsh reality. In all
adjudicated cases in which the court entered a judgment for possession, landlords
were granted possession 99.4% of the time; 95 at trial, landlords were granted

193. Shaw Interview, supra note 6.
194. Our observations are based on a comparison between 64 summary process cases (all of which
settled) mediated by HCAC in 1995 at Northampton District Court and 219 adjudicated cases (including
trials, defaults, non-stipulated dismissals, and non-suits) and 109 negotiated (i.e., non-mediated) cases
at those same courts. Some cases were not easy to classify. For example, 47 cases were dismissed

voluntarily by the plaintiff/landlord. While we chose to classify these cases as "adjudicated" cases, they
just as easily could have been classified as "negotiated" cases, in that negotiations might have led to an
.off the record" agreement to dismiss. Generally, we considered cases adjudicated if the court either
entered a judgment or disposed of a case without any record in the file of an agreement directing the
court's judgement or disposition. Cases were considered negotiated only if there was explicit evidence
of an agreement between the parties in the court records. It is worth noting that our results would have
been essentially the same had we chosen to classify these cases differently.
195. Out of the 219 adjudicated cases, the court entered a judgment for possession in 157 of them.
156 of the 157 cases granted judgment to the landlord for possession. This statistic, however, is
somewhat misleading in that tenants' 'victories" often result in no judgment being entered at all. For
example, in the remaining 62 adjudicated cases in which no judgment entered:
*
Tenants got the case dismissed in 2 cases.
*
*

Landlords voluntarily dismissed the case in 47 cases.
Landlords did not show up at court in 12 cases.
The case was continued (am'd is still pending) in I case.
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possession 97.7% of the time;" 9 tenants defaulted 52.1% of the time; 97 and while
tenants raised counterclaims approximately 21.2% of the time, 98 tenants won on
these claims only 11.4% of the time.' 99 There were no cases in which the court
issued an order for the landlord to do repairs. While this situation represented a
significant improvement over that which exists at Plymouth and Hingham District
Courts, perhaps because of the efforts of HCAC's tenant counseling services, the
outlook of going to court for tenants was still a bleak one.
The outlook was even more bleak for those tenants who resolved their summary
process disputes through a non-mediated/negotiated settlement. All of the nonmediated agreements examined granted possession to the landlord, and only one
arranged for possession to revert to the tenant if certain conditions were fulfilled.2"
As was the case in Plymouth and Hingham, agreements at Northampton District
Court were incredibly "pro-landlord" and tended to be drafted by the attorney for the
landlord. In most agreements, the tenant simply agreed to move out, pay the back
rent, and waive all of his or her rights to appeal. By far, the most popular clause in
the non-mediated agreements was one promising that "the tenant will vacate by X
date."20' None of the agreements contained any provisions for landlords to make
repairs or for rent abatements due to conditions problems.
Tenants who went to mediation fared considerably better."0 While all of the
sixty-four cases examined resulted in agreements that granted possession to the
landlord, a full 41.2% of the mediated agreements provided a process for tenants to

If these additional 62 adjudicated cases are included, then landlords received possession 71.2% of the
time, tenants received possession 1.3% of the time (once via court verdict and twice via motion to
dismiss), and it was unclear 27.5% of the time. The latter 27.5% of cases were dismissed, and it is not
clear from the court records who effectively ended up with possession.
196. After a hearing on the merits, landlords were granted possession by the judge in 42 out of 43
cases.
197. Tenants defaulted in 114 out of 219 adjudicated cases.
198. This figure is based on a partial survey of the data. Tenants filed counterclaims in35 out of 165
adjudicated cases examined (representing 75.3% of the entire sample of adjudicated cases).
199. Of the 35 adjudicated cases in which counterclaims were found, tenants were granted partial
judgments on their counterclaims in four of them.
200. Of 100 agreements examined, 99 granted possession to the landlord and only one left open the
possibility of the tenant regaining possession if he/she was able to stick to the terms of a payment plan.
In nine other cases, the parties agreed to dismiss the case. However, it is not clear whether these
dismissals were the product of the tenant agreeing to move out or the landlord agreeing to let the tenant
stay. In the end, 90.8% of the non-mediated agreements granted possession to the landlord, 0.9% gave
the tenant an opportunity to regain possession, and 9.1% were unclear about who effectively maintained
possession.
201. These conclusions are based on the authors' examination of all of the 109 non-mediated
agreements. While no official count was kept of the frequency of various clauses in the agreements, it
was obvious that the tenant's promise to vacate was by far the most popular clause. Similarly, in spite
of the fact that there was no official count, it is safe to say that the agreements were overwhelmingly onesided in favor of landlords.
202. Our conclusions are based on a close examination of 51 out of HCAC's 64 mediated cases for
1995. The sample does not include mediations which did not lead to a settlement. HCAC's settlement
rate is approximately 87.8%. See Memo, "HCAC Housing Services Program Project Outcomes:
September 1, 1994- August 31, 1995," supra note 202.
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reinstate their tenancy and maintain their housing.0 3 Furthermore, 23.5% of the
agreements provided for reductions in back rent owed due to either the tenant's
counterclaims or in consideration for the tenant vacating by a certain date." 4
Landlords agreed to perform necessary repairs in 9.8% of the mediated cases.2"5
Generally successful payment plans were set up in 58.8% of the cases. In fact,
mediated agreements were breached only 15.8% of the time.2° 6 Finally, tenants
agreed to vacate the premises in only 33.3% of the mediated cases. 0 7
Executions for possession were significantly less likely to be issued against
tenants who mediated than they were against tenants who had their cases heard
before the court or who settled them without the help of a mediator. While
landlords obtained executions for possession in 69.8% of the cases that went to trial
and 63.8% of cases that settled without mediation, executions were obtained in
mediated cases only 46.9% of the time.23 Given that a significant number of
mediated cases allow for the possibility of possession reverting to the tenant, it is
likely that a large number of the cases in which execution did not issue represent
cases in which evictions were avoided. The same cannot be said for the alternatives
to mediation.
Furthermore, when executions did issue for possession, tenants who mediated
had, on average, more time before they had to vacate than tenants who opted to
litigate or settle without mediators. In cases in which an execution was served after
a trial, it took an average of 58.1 days (based on 30 cases) from the time the
complaint was filed until execution was issued. In non-mediated/negotiated cases,
it took an average of 52.7 days (based on 67 cases). In contrast, in mediated cases
where an execution was issued it took an average of 77.7 days (based on 28 cases)
from the time the complaint was filed until the execution was served. What is truly
astonishing is that the average time for execution to issue in mediated cases (77.7
days) exceeds the average time for cases in which tenants were represented by
attorneys (72.8 days--based on 20 cases). 2"

203. 19 out of the 51 cases examined provided that the tenant would keep possession and the action
would be dismissed if the tenant satisfied the terms of a payment plan. Two other agreements provided
that the tenant would keep possession if a relative who was dealing drugs in the apartment was removed
from the apartment and never allowed to visit.

204. Most of these reductions were due to the tenant's counterclaims, as opposed to agreements to
vacate.

205. Landlords agreed to make repairs in five out of the 51 cases examined.
206. Payment plans were administered in 30 out of the 51 cases observed. Follow-ups were done
by the authors on 38 mediated agreements and only six resulted in a breach of the agreement.
207. Tenants agreed to vacate in only 17 out of the 51 cases observed.
208. Landlords obtained executions in 30 out of 43 cases that went to trial; 67 out of 105 nonmediated/negotiated cases; and only 30 out of 64 mediated cases. It is difficult to determine the
significance of the execution not issuing. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. However, the data
suggests that mediated cases are less likely than the alternatives to lead to eviction.
209. Although there appears to be no statistical difference between the two averages, it is well worth
noting that, in some instances, mediation leads to outcomes for tenants that are comparable to those
achieved by attorneys. Given the small sample size, we would not suggest drawing the conclusion that
mediation isequally effective as legal representation inprotecting tenants' rights. Even in our sample,
tenants with attorneys were much more likely to get their case dismissed altogether than were tenants
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Finally, HCAC agreements cannot be labeled as either generally pro-landlord
or pro-tenant. The overwhelming majority of agreements are filed on a standard
" and
form, which includes blanks to be filled in not only for "rent owed
upossession for _
_" but also for "rent reduced by
_ on account of the
I provided
tenant's claims" and "defendant's tenancy shall be reinstated on
that s/he has paid the total amount of this judgment and has become current on
his/her rent." Thus, the four most popular clauses in HCAC mediated agreements
are fairly balanced: (1) The tenant will pay the landlord $X, over time, according to
the following payment plan (present in 58.8% of agreements); (2) The defendant's
if certain conditions are met (present in
tenancy shall be reinstated on
41.2% of agreements); (3) The tenant will vacate by X date (present in 33.3% of
agreements); and (4) The rent owed is reduced by $X on account of the tenant's
claims (present in 23.5% of agreements).
5. Conclusion
HCAC mediations provide results for tenants that appear to be significantly
better for them than the results provided by either of the two real-life alternatives.
The most probable explanation for this is that the program works in conjunction with
a counseling program that informs all tenants who have been served with summary
process complaints of the availability of free legal advice. It does this, however, at
an increased risk that the program will lose its (perceived) neutrality. Nevertheless,
tenants who mediate with HCAC are more likely to be informed of their legal rights
before going into a mediation. However, HCAC's approach to incorporating the
law into mediations-- which is "facilitative" with respect to substantive legal rights
and "directive"with respect to procedural legal rights-- does little to ensure that
tenants who are not informed of their rights prior to the mediation will become
informed during the mediation.

who went through mediation (47.4% of cases with attorneys were dismissed without a judgment of
possession being entered, while no mediated cases were.).
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D. The Centerfor Mediation in Law (CML)
1. General Description
The fourth program we examine does not do summary process mediation at all
and is not even located in the Massachusetts area. Rather, the Center for Mediation
in Law, located in Mill Valley, California, provides mediation training
predominantly for those interested in mediating divorce and/or commercial cases.
For this reason, we examine not the program itself, but rather its unique approach to
incorporating the law into mediation, and we examine its potential application to the
summary process arena.
The Center for Mediation in Law clearly aspires to provide a process which
would be located in Quadrant Three of our theoretical graph-- one which allows the
parties to focus on both their interests and their legal rights. Thus, CML seeks to
incorporate the law into mediation in order to give the parties an opportunity to "go
beyond it." Under CML's approach, parties are informed that one of the goals of
the mediation is to come up with an agreement that they both think is fair,
and the
210
uthe law" will be "one of several reference points" to help them decide.
In the view of CML, incorporating the law into a mediation is no easy task. The
problem lies in the fact that most parties tend to see the role of the law in terms of
a false dichotomy in which they view the law as either outcome determinative or
entirely irrelevant.2 ' The mediator's goal, therefore, is to introduce the law in order
to help the parties see that it is relevant both as a practical alternative and as an
expression of societal norms, while at the same time to make sure that neither party
comes to think of the law as dispositive. 212 The dangers of the law taking too central
of a role are everpresent. In the words of CML Director, Gary J. Friedman, "The law
[can be] like an elephant in the room. The mediator's job is to discharge the power
... the law has over people 213 in order to enable them to use the law as a tool that
can help them make a truly informed decision about what they think is fair. 214 The
mediators "free the parties from the law" by dealing with it directly. The program
strongly believes that mediators have a professional responsibility to the parties to
learn the law and explain its proper role to the parties. Hence, mediators will tell the
parties directly what "the law" says about their case, both procedurally and
substantively, while explaining to them the limitations of such predictions and their
proper role in the process. In response to the traditional concerns about such an
approach--namely, that the mediator could be wrong, the parties might see the

210. Friedman Interview, supra note 102.
211. It is this same false dichotomy that leads many mediators to the conclusion that mediating in
Quadrant Three of our theoretical graph is not really possible. As pointed out previously, the critics fall
prey to this same false dichotomy. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
212. See Center for Mediation in Law, supra note 105, Memo No. 6.
213. Friedman Interview, supra note 102.
214. This view supports our argument that the values of informed consent and self-determination

are inextricably related. True empowerment/self-determination requires that people make autonomous
decisions which have little value if they are uninformed.
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mediator as favoring the party who she or he says is favored by the law, and the
parties might place too much significance on the mediator's prediction--CML
mediators are instructed to be both aware of those potential pitfalls and to alert the
parties to them by sharing their concerns about them with the parties.
Hence, the role of the mediator, the parties, and "the law" are carefully
explained at the outset of the mediation and legal information is almost always
coupled with a careful reminder about the proper role of the law, the mediator, and
the parties. For example, before making legal predictions, mediators will explain to
the parties that "there is some uncertainty in the law, so I could be wrong" and that
"you shouldn't defer to my opinion if it differs from what seems right to you."" 5
Likewise, mediators might remind parties that "what is personally fair to you [is] the
highest priority here" and that "[y]ou are not bound here by the law, although you
are free to use it as a reference point."2"6 Finally, if a party accuses a mediator of
aligning with the other party after hearing a prediction about the law that is
unfavorable to him or her, a mediator might respond by saying, "I'm sorry you feel
that way. But what I am trying to do is what I think you both asked for--to give you
as clear an indication as I can about how the law would apply to your situation. I
don't want either of you21 7agreeing to something without understanding the legal
context of the decision."
In the view of the program, the purpose of offering legal predictions is to make
sure the parties truly understand the law. If the parties are simply told what the black
letter law says, they still will not know what matters to them most--namely how
courts generally apply the law. Rules about "legal advice" and "legal information"
notwithstanding, it is the view of the program that mediators, like lawyers, should
be able to offer parties the benefit of their legal expertise--i.e., that legal predictions
should not be considered legal advice. Ideally, the parties would see the mediator
"as a neutral friend who happens to understand how a court would view [the parties']
21
situation."
In "hard cases," predictions are given less emphasis. Where there is
considerable uncertainty about what a court might do, it is more important that
parties understand the principles that would guide a court in making its decision.
Hence, in difficult cases, mediators might explain to the parties the arguments he or
she might make before the judge if he or she were acting as the lawyer for each
party. Once the parties understand the principles underlying the legal debate, they
will be equipped to make an informed decision about what principles they think are
most fair--which is the program's ultimate goal in incorporating the law.219

215. GARY J. FuEDMAN,A GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION 87 (New York: Workman Publishing
Co., Inc., 1993).
216. Center for Mediation in Law, "Explanation of the Mediation Process," Memo No. 5 (1983)
(training materials).
217. Friedman, supra note 216, at 91.
218. Id.at 85.

219. Gary Friedman describes a technique he uses whereby he stands behind one party and declares,
"This is what I would say if I were your lawyer...." and then stands behind the other party and says,
* He then turns to both parties and says, "Now,
"Now, this is what I would say if I wereyour lawyer ....
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2. "Evaluation": Potential for Application to Summary Process Cases

Applying CML's approach to incorporating the law into mediation in summary
process cases could potentially enable the parties to obtain a high level of
understanding of both their legal rights and their interests during the mediation. This
is because the CML approach allows the mediators to explain to parties what are
their legal rights - both procedurally and substantively--and to predict what a court
might do in a given case.
There are various reasons, however, why it may prove difficult in practice to
translate this mediation approach into the summary process arena. First, while the
approach works well with sophisticated parties, there is a significant risk that poorly
educated tenants will view the mediators' legal interpretations and predictions as
binding. Second, the approach creates a larger risk to mediator neutrality than those
used by MWI and HCAC. Lastly, mediators employing the CML approach in
summary process cases would face difficult decisions regarding which laws to
introduce. A number of different statutes and regulations may be relevant to such
cases, and mediators may not realistically be able to fully explain all of these laws
to the parties in the short time period allotted to summary process mediations. In
spite of these potential obstacles, however, it is possible that the CML approach can
be effectively adapted to summary process mediations.

VII. PRESCRIPTIVE ADVICE
The summary process mediator in Massachusetts faces unique challenges in
upholding the principles of mediation. Anecdotal evidence from various parts of the
state reveals that tenants almost universally do not understand the multitude of legal
rights or procedural rules designed to protect them; data from a variety of courts
corroborates this fact. In contrast, landlords tend to be well-informed repeat players,
who are represented by experienced counsel. These power imbalances pose a major
obstacle to the summary process mediator who wishes to preserve the fairness of the
process.
It is not enough to say, as some mediators have, that mediation cannot and
should not be concerned with the protection of rights.22 Even when protection of
rights is not the primary goal of mediation, the central goals of empowerment and
self-determination cannot truly be fulfilled when parties are ignorant of the legal
context surrounding their decisions. True empowerment, we would argue, entails
making an informed, autonomous choice about one's own future. Is it truly
empowering for a tenant to agree to vacate an apartment when he or she does so only
because he or she erroneously believes that he or she has no legitimate arguments for

you both know as much as I do. What do you think would be fair for the judge to decide?" Friedman
Interview, supra note 102.
220. See e.g., Bush, supra note 115, at 265 (arguing that mediators cannot effectively concern
themselves with protecting the parties' rights "without undermining their usefulness altogether.')
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staying? Mediations that take place when parties are grossly uninformed do little to
further the central principle of "interest-based mediation": self-determination.
Yet mediators are not and cannot be advocates for the uninformed or
disempowered. A mediator's neutrality is indispensable to his or her role, and, as
critics of mediation point out, there appears to be an inherent tension between
ensuring fair agreements and maintaining neutrality.2" As one mediator/scholar has
argued, "mediators who try to protect substantive rights and guarantee that
agreements are fair must adopt substantive positions that inevitably compromise
their impartiality, either in actuality or in the parties' eyes."' Moreover, the context
of summary process aggravates these dangers: if mediators introduce a process that
informs tenants of their rights, it will not be perceived as neutral when judged in
comparison to the present system. The problem is further magnified by the fact that
the process is voluntary: landlords will probably not agree to participate in a process
that they perceive to be adverse to their interests.
But remaining true to the principles of informed consent and self-determination
does not require that mediators lead the parties toward certain substantive outcomes.
Rather, it requires that mediators enable parties to make informed autonomous
decisions by making sure that they understand the legal context in which they make
their decisions. While this will inevitably raise neutrality concerns--especially in a
context such as housing law, where the law seems to so clearly favor one side over
the other--there is no reason that mediators cannot ensure that the parties are
informed while addressing the potential neutrality issues openly at the outset and
throughout the mediation. Furthermore, while housing law is pro-tenant, its
application often favors the landlord, making the truth about the law somewhat more
balanced--and more palatable to all parties involved--than a cursory glance at the law
might suggest.
Therefore, we believe that summary process mediators can and should
implement dispute resolution processes which focus on both the parties' interests and
their rights. Mediation processes which solely focus on an individual's interests at
the expense of their rights too often result in unacceptably low levels of informed
consent. The ideal mediation, we would suggest, produces fully-informed,
autonomous decisions made by the parties after considering both parties' interests
and rights.
The ideal, however, is difficult to achieve in practice. A rights and interestbased approach to mediation is much more demanding of the mediator than
alternative approaches which focus solely on rights or interests. To be successful,
the mediator must be both adept at conflict resolution techniques and knowledgeable
of the relative substantive law.
The most aggressive approaches to incorporating law into mediations--such as
that employed by CML-come closest to achieving the ideal when done properly, but

221. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
222. See Bush, supra note 115, at 265. See also JOSEPH STULBERG, TAKING CHARGE/MANAGING
CONFLICT 141-49 (1987); Joseph Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor
Susskind," 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 88-91 (1981).
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they also have the potential to cause considerable harm when done improperly.
Moreover, a significant obstacle exists for most mediation programs to implementing
such an approach--namely, it puts lawyers in a unique position to effectively achieve
the ideal.
There are good reasons why only attorneys should attempt to implement the
most aggressive approaches to incorporating the law into mediations. First, unless
the mediators explaining the law to the parties are experienced attorneys, there is a
significant risk that the parties will receive either inaccurate or incomplete
information. Second, while non-attorney mediators are often able skillfully to
master some complicated but discrete bodies of law, such as summary process law,
such well-trained, non-lawyer mediators mnay still fail to spot related, relevant legal
issues that may not fall into their area of limited legal expertise. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, non-lawyer mediators who attempt to inform the parties as to how
the law applies to their particular fact-situation will likely find themselves facing
accusations of illegal practice of law.
Given that many of the most skilled mediators are non-attorneys, an aggressive
approach to incorporating the law into mediation would significantly limit the pool
of talented mediators upon which parties and court systems could draw. For this
reason, despite the fact that we find that such an aggressive approach comes closest
to the ideal when practiced by an adept and experienced attorney-mediator, we
would recommend that most mediation programs conducting summary process
mediations do not attempt to introduce such a process. Moreover, our empirical
research suggests that less aggressive approaches to incorporating the law into
mediation may be worth pursuing. With this in mind, we offer the following
suggestions for mediators-both lawyers and non-lawyers--who wish to help raise the
level of informed consent present in landlord/tenant mediations.
A. Legal Reform
Ideally, mediators would not have to serve the function of informing the parties
of their legal rights. Given the tension between conveying legal advice and
maintaining neutrality, it would better serve the principles of mediation if the parties
came to the mediation already fully informed. In the best of all possible worlds, all
parties would have the benefit of legal counsel.223 Unfortunately, this is neither
financially feasible nor politically realistic in our present society. Nevertheless, there
are still significant measures, which are both relatively inexpensive and eminently
practical, that state governments can take to ensure that poor, disadvantaged parties,
who cannot afford counsel, are informed of their legal rights. For example, state
courts could be required by law to make a Upro se summary process packet" available
to all landlords when they pick up and/or file the summons and complaint and to

223. Unlike many mediators, we are of the firm belief that access to counsel for all parties would be
a benefit to both mediation and the court system generally.
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have the same packet sent to tenants by the court at the time they are served. 24 To
be effective, such a packet would have to be written in plain language and clearly
spell out all of the relevant defenses and counterclaims for tenants, as well as how
eviction proceedings work. Such a proposal would take the burden of acquiring
legal information off of those who realistically cannot afford it and place it on those
who are in a much better position to make sure that the relevant information gets to
those who need it most.
While such a proposal would be financially feasible, the political reality is that
there is little to no chance that such drastic legal reform will occur. Hence, we offer
some more practical suggestions as well.
B. Tenant Counseling
HCAC's combination of mediation services and "tenant counseling" appears to
be an effective way to give tenants an opportunity to inform themselves prior to the
mediation. To maintain the neutrality of the mediation program, however, it is
important to separate the two services as much as possible.
Mediation programs could take it upon themselves to set up such a service. To
avoid the appearance of favoring one side over the other, programs that undertake
such a project should be sure to offer services to both landlords and tenants who
need them. There is little cost to making the same information available to parties
on both sides; such a move may help preserve the perceived neutrality of the
mediation program. In any event, the role of the mediator is to.make sure that both
parties are informed.
Providing free information for those parties involved in housing disputes would
increase the visibility of mediation in the legal community while ensuring that the
goals of mediation are met at the same time. Given the current percentage of parties
that are completely uninformed of their rights before mediating and the difficulties
of educating such parties while mediating, mediation programs should consider it
part of their professional responsibility to inform the parties.

224. Alternatively, the rules could require that landlords include the packet when serving the tenant
with the summons and complaint While such a suggestion appears to go against the principles of our
adversary system, it is clear that there is enough "market failure" here to justify such a measure. The
adversary system, like mediation, cannot effectively achieve its goals if an entire class of parties are as
grossly uninformed as the data suggests.
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C. Change the Timing of the Mediation
Because most summary process mediations take place on the date of trial,
tenants who have failed to file an answer have already waived all of their possible
defenses and counterclaims. While there would be value to introducing the law to
parties who have already forfeited their rights (i.e., it would allow parties to consider
the law as one reference point in helping them decide what they think is fair),
mediations would be much more empowering if parties were informed of their legal
entitlements in time for them to assert them. Mediation programs should, therefore,
strongly encourage parties to mediate prior to the date of the hearing.
Since it is the experience of most mediation programs that parties are reluctant
to mediate prior to the hearing date, even when encouraged to do so,22 mediation
programs should encourage the courts they work in to join them in urging the parties
to consider mediating at an earlier date. Ideally, a court-sponsored, voluntary
"settlement conference" would be suggested to the parties as an option and mediation
services would be made available.
D. Bring Law Into the Mediation 'Preemptively"
Mediators can fulfill their responsibility of informing the parties by providing
parties with neutrally worded "information packets" which describe the relevant
summary process law and explain some of the principles underlying the law. These
information packets could be given to parties prior to mediating, alerting them to
frequently raised issues and the laws surrounding them. Unlike other approaches
which put the burden of thinking of the relevant legal issues on those who are least
capable of doing so (i.e., the frequently uninformed parties),226 this more "directive"
approach takes the burden of thinking of the relevant legal issues off of the
frequently uninformed parties while staying somewhat "facilitative" by keeping the
burden on the parties to raise the legal issues that matter to them most. To avoid
charges of non-neutrality, the packets should be made available to both parties and
their purpose should be clearly explained.
E. Have MediatorsExplain the Law to the Parties
At the very least, parties should have the opportunity to get legal information
that relates to their case. This should be done in a manner that makes the
information as accessible as possible to the parties. Hence, it is preferable to have
the mediator explain to the parties in simple, understandable language what the law

225. See Doran Interview, supra note 6; Interview with Gordon Shaw, Mediation Coordinator at
Hampshire Community Action Commission (March 11, 1996).
226.For example, MWI's authoritative resource approach and HCAC's "facilitative" approach with
regard to substantive law both put the burden on the parties to think of the relevant legal issues. Ifthe
party comes to the mediation uninformed, then there is little likelihood that she or he will know enough
to even ask the right questions.
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says rather than simply presenting the parties with the relevant statutes or regulations
in all of their complexity. Parties are unlikely to understand the formal language of
legal statutes and regulations and should not be expected to make sense of
complications statutes and regulations on their own. Of course, this requires that
mediators know the law well; however, so does the alternative method of relying on
an authoritative resource, which requires mediators to know when, where, and how
to look for the relevant law on point. To avoid situations where there is a direct
conflict between one of the parties and the mediator over the meaning of the law,
mediators can bring an "authoritative resource" with them to help settle or open up
an honest dialogue about any potential disputes. Another alternative is to not only
use an "authoritative resource," but also to explain to the parties what the relevant
statutes and regulations mean. The pitfall to be avoided is placing the burden of
deciphering the meaning of complex legal texts on those who are least likely to be
able to do so.

VIII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, critics have attacked mediation for its failure to adequately
address power imbalances between disputants. Critics charge that ignorant parties
routinely agree to settlements which fail to acknowledge their substantive legal
rights. At first glance, this argument appears particularly persuasive within the realm
of landlord/tenant mediations as the law is both obscure and highly protective of
tenants. While these observations carry some truth, the critics fail to recognize that
in comparison to the real world alternatives, mediation's outcomes are often more
advantageous to tenants. Contrary to critic's charges that mediators ignore the law
in the name of neutrality and self-determination, many mediation approaches do
incorporate the law, thus providing parties with the opportunity to make informed,
autonomous decisions regarding their future. By effectively focusing parties on both
their interests and rights, mediation can adequately protect the poor and
disempowered parties, while still providing disputants with an opportunity to shape
their own fate.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/5

66

